The Reverse Agency Problem in the Age of Compliance by Eckstein, Asaf & Parchomovsky, Gideon
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
9-24-2019 
The Reverse Agency Problem in the Age of Compliance 
Asaf Eckstein 
Ono Academic College 
Gideon Parchomovsky 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Agency Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business 
Organizations Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Litigation 
Commons, and the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons 
Repository Citation 
Eckstein, Asaf and Parchomovsky, Gideon, "The Reverse Agency Problem in the Age of Compliance" 
(2019). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2103. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2103 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
1 REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF COMPLIANCE [7-Aug-19 
 
 
THE REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF 
COMPLIANCE 
 




The agency problem, the idea that corporate directors and officers are 
motivated to prioritize their self-interest over the interest of their 
corporation, has had long-lasting impact on corporate law theory and 
practice. In recent years, however, as federal agencies have stepped up 
enforcement efforts against corporations, a new problem that is the mirror 
image of the agency problem has surfaced—the reverse agency problem. The 
surge in criminal investigations against corporations, combined with the 
rising popularity of settlement mechanisms including Pretrial Diversion 
Agreements (PDAs), and corporate plea agreements, has led corporations to 
sacrifice directors and officers in order to reach settlements with law 
enforcement authorities as expeditiously as possible.  
While such settlements are in the best interest of companies and 
shareholders, they have devastating effects for individual directors and 
officers. When settling through agreements, suspect companies usually 
attribute wrongdoing to a large group of directors and managers, without 
distinguishing among guilty and innocent individuals, and surrender all their 
information. As a result, directors and officers implicated in settlements may 
suffer severe reputational loss and face legal battles brought by corporations. 
Furthermore, the wrongdoing attributed to directors and officers in 
settlements expose them to derivative lawsuits for breach of their fiduciary 
duties. Unfortunately, extant law does not provide directors and officers with 
a means to prove their innocence or clear their name. In fact, it does not even 
give them a voice in the negotiations leading to the drafting of settlements. 
Thus, it dooms many directors and officers who have done no wrong to live 
with the mark of Cain and endure the economic consequences thereof.  
 
 Associate Professor, the Ono Academic College.  
 Robert G. Fuller, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and 
Professor of Law, Hebrew University School of Law, Israel. We are grateful to Abraham Bell, 
Zohar Goshen, Asaf Hamdani, Sharon Hannes, Ehud Kamar, Adi Libson, Theodore N. 
Mirvis, Edward Rock, Peter Siegelman, Alex Stein, and Ziqian Tao for invaluable comment 
and criticisms. This Article was presented at a joint conference of Ono Academic College and 
Columbia Law School (2019).  
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To remedy the plight of individual directors and officers, we suggest three 
possible legal reforms. The first seeks to amplify the voice of individual 
corporate officers in settlement negotiations by giving them a right to a 
hearing prior to the finalization of a settlement. The second is to give 
directors and officers implicated in settlements the right to bring an action 
for a declaratory judgment that could clear their name and preempt 
derivative actions against them. The third solution is to recognize a 
horizontal fiduciary duty between directors and officers, thereby allowing 
innocent directors and officers the right to sue their guilty colleagues for 
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In this Article, we seek to unveil a new phenomenon that increasingly 
permeates the corporate world: the reverse agency problem. To introduce this 
problem, we first need to introduce its more famous cousin: the agency 
problem. In their seminal book, Berle and Means coined the term agency 
problem, which refers to the ability of directors and officers to shirk their 
duties and to divert value from corporations, i.e., extract private benefits from 
corporations with dispersed ownership.1 The article has had an immediate 
and long-lasting effect on corporate law theory and practice. Indeed, no other 
scholarly contribution had the same impact on the field. The idea that 
directors and officers are willing to sacrifice the interest of the corporation to 
promote their narrow self-interest is both intuitive and correct. It would not 
be an exaggeration to say that since the book was published in 1932, the 
agency problem has been the focal point of corporate law theory.2  
Oddly, in recent years we are witnessing a mirror image of the agency 
problem: corporations are willing to sacrifice their directors and officers (i.e., 
their agents) at the altar of the corporations’ best interests. We term this trend 
“the reverse agency problem.”3 It is not an accident that this problem has 
gone unnoticed so far: it is a relatively new phenomenon that did not exist in 
the past. Yet, it is significant and ubiquitous and it is only likely to grow in 
the future. The reverse agency problem is a byproduct of the age of 
compliance.  Since the mid-2000s, companies have been exposed to 
enforcement actions on the part of various federal regulatory agencies, such 
as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and the Internal Revenue Services (IRS), and criminal proceedings 
 
1  ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
2 Other very famous Articles that discuss various variations of the agency problem 
include: Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activists Investors 
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Zohar Goshen 
& Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 
COLUM. L. REV. 767 (2017) [hereinafter Principal Cost].  
3 There is family resemblance between the reverse agency problem and the problem of 
principal cost that has been pointed out by Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire in a recent 
important article. See Principal Costs, supra note 2. Goshen and Squire’s theory focuses on 
the costs created by shareholders, which they divide into “competence costs” and “integrity 
costs” and argue that the law should minimize the sum of agency and principal costs. As we 
will explain the reverse agency problem is independent of the actions or characteristics of 
shareholders. In fact, it is unrelated to the ownership structure. At its heart, it is a problem 
that arises from the rational and legitimate actions of the management and directors of firms 
in the face of enforcement actions.  
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initiated by state agencies, such as the New York State Department of 
Financial Services (DFS).4  
A considerable number of these investigations do not culminate in 
criminal charges. Rather, they are settled outside of court in the form of 
“Pretrial Diversion Agreements” (PDAs),5 which includes mainly Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non Prosecution Agreements (NPAs). 
Many other cases are settled post-indictment through plea agreement.6 We 
refer to these agreements collectively as settlement agreements.  
As a part of these agreements, the corporations are required to admit to 
various counts of wrongdoing by their directors, managers, and other 
employees. These agents, many of whom are no longer employed by the 
relevant companies at the time the agreement is consummated, typically have 
little or no say in the process and will forever have to live with the admissions 
that their corporations have made—admissions that implicate them in 
wrongdoing. And although these admissions do not formally bind them, they 
have a profound impact on their future. These employees suffer severe 
reputational losses as a consequence of these agreements, which often 
translate to lost careers and lost income.  
Worse yet, the admissions made by corporations invariably expose 
directors and officers to follow-up civil suits against them.7 The admissions 
in settlement agreements speak of various failures by the directors and 
officers. They are drafted in strong language and, thus, serve as an invitation 
to shareholders to demand that the corporation sues its directors and officers 
for a breach of the duty of loyalty or a breach of the duty of care, and if the 
corporation refuses to do so, to initiate a derivative action against them.  
And even though the admissions made by a company do not typically 
bind the agents and they can bring an independent action to have their name 
cleared, they are facing an uphill climb. At that point, the company has given 
up on them and sacrificed them on the altar of the wellbeing of the 
shareholders. Surprisingly, for many years, law enforcement authorities 
refrained from persecuting individual directors and officers8  and sufficed 
 
4 See infra Section II.A. 
5 See Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-
Prosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2017) ("In the entire period prior to issuance of the 
Thompson Memo in January 2003, prosecutors negotiated only thirteen PDAs [pretrial 
diversion agreements]. . . . By contrast, we find based on our dataset that they entered into at 
least 267 PDAs from 2004 through 2014 (excluding agreements involving antitrust, tax, and 
environmental violations)."). See also Section II.B.1. 
6 See infra Section II.B.3. 
7 See infra note 110. 
8 In an effort to respond to a significant criticism arguing that the DOJ fails to prosecute 
individuals, in September 2015, the Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates issued a new 
policy in the form of a memorandum, entitled “Individual Accountability for Corporate 
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themselves with the fines they collect from firms. Following harsh criticism 
of this practice, in recent years, law enforcement authorities started initiating 
legal actions against individual employees, but to a very limited extent.9 In 
the small number of cases that law enforcement authorities proceeded to 
bring charges against individual employees, the employees did not have the 
financial wherewithal or the psychological resources to continue the fight on 
their own. Quite surprisingly, however, the individual directors and officers 
who got sued have experienced success in court.10 Yet, even if the directors 
and officers are ultimately acquitted in court, they still have to confront 
prolonged legal battles on multiple fronts as derivative actions may be filed 
against them while they struggle to clear their names.  
At this point, one may wonder: how can this be? There are two pieces to 
the puzzle. The first is clear. Companies that face criminal charges have an 
incentive to reach a settlement at all cost. To begin with, once a criminal 
investigation is opened against them, companies are at a high risk of criminal 
indictment and conviction if they choose not to fully cooperate with the 
enforcement authority. As history teaches us, indictment, not to mention 
conviction, has a dramatic negative impact on companies.11  The accepted 
lore in the corporate law world is that “no major financial services firm has 
ever survived a criminal indictment.”12 
Furthermore, unlike individuals who are subject to a criminal 
investigation, corporations who face criminal allegations have to bear the cost 
of the investigation. Although the enforcement authorities do not actively 
force suspect corporations to examine the allegations at their own expense, 
they condition future settlement on full cooperation, and give corporations 
credit for carrying out the investigation on their own and submitting their 
 
Wrongdoing,” or the “Yates Memo.” See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. Att’ys et al., Individual Accountability for 
Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter Yates Memo].  
9 Paola C. Henry, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crimes After the Yates Memo: 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements & Criminal Justice Reform, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 153, 
160–161 (2016) (“After the release of the Yates Memo, the DOJ continued to use DPAs in 
several cases where no individual employees were charged. . . . Thus, the government's 
continued use of DPAs without any individual accountability undermines the Yates Memo.”) 
10 See infra note 141. 
11  Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial 
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1886 
(2005) (“The adverse publicity that accompanies a prosecution can devastate a 
corporation…”). See also infra notes 91 - 97.  
12 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Amici point out 
that no major financial services firm has ever survived a criminal indictment”). 
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findings to the authorities.13 Actually, as DOJ’s Yates Memo stated: “in order 
to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the 
Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the 
misconduct.”14 The cost of conducting an internal investigation runs in the 
tens of millions of dollars and can often reach hundreds of millions of dollars 
and it comes on top of standard defense costs.15  
To make matters worse, the uncertainty that comes with a criminal 
investigation imposes an almost insurmountable drag on the corporation and 
its ability to raise money.16 It constitutes a serious diversion of managerial 
resources, forcing the corporation to focus on the criminal investigation, 
instead of its core business activity.17 From the vantage point of the company, 
dragging out the investigation is tantamount to a death by a thousand cuts as 
the costs mount with every day that passes.  
On top of it, a criminal investigation harms the company’s reputation and 
makes it difficult for the corporation to do business with other companies as 
long as the investigation is ongoing. Potential and actual business partners 
become suspicious once they learn of the investigation and demand constant 
clarifications and assurances from the suspect company. This is especially 
true for suspicious financial institutions that inherently rely on business ties 
with correspondent banks.18 Naturally, if the clarifications and assurances are 
 
13 Department of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, 
U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) 9-28.700—The Value of Cooperation, 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-
organizations#_ftnref1 (“Cooperation is a mitigating factor, by which a corporation—just 
like any other subject of criminal investigation—can gain credit in a case that otherwise is 
appropriate for indictment and prosecution.”). 
14 Yates Memo, supra note 8, at 2. 
15  Samuel Rubinfeld, Costly Corporate Investigations Have No Natural End-Point, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2017) (“The numbers, in some cases, are eye-popping. Wall Mart 
Stores, which is still under investigation, has spent $865 million since 2013, according to a 
review of its quarterly disclosures; the company says it's cooperating with U.S. authorities 
amid discussions of a potential resolution. Avon Products spent about $350 million on 
investigation-related costs before agreeing to pay U.S. authorities $135 million to settle its 
foreign-bribery probe. Siemens reported spending more than $1 billion on legal costs 
before its FCPA resolution in 2008.”). See also Peter J. Henning, The Mounting Costs of 
Internal Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2012) (“When a corporation is caught in a 
government investigation, the legal fees can quickly exceed $100 million”). 
16 Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 509 
(2015) (“Legal practitioners stated: The reality is that few public or regulated companies can 
withstand the uncertainties and consequences that flow from an unresolved federal criminal 
indictment . . . .”) 
17 Infra note 84. 
18  Greenblum, supra note 11, at 1886 (“The adverse publicity that accompanies a 
prosecution can devastate a corporation…, particularly one that relies heavily on its 
7 REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF COMPLIANCE [7-Aug-19 
 
 
not satisfactory, valuable business relationships will be lost. Hence, 
corporations will be readily willing to admit to wrongdoing by their agents to 
put an end to the investigation and hopefully sweeten the bitter pill by 
receiving a reduced fine.19 In many ways, this is the same dynamic that 
undergirds plea bargains.  
The second piece of the puzzle is less obvious. It concentrates on the 
question of how it is possible that companies are guilty of breaking the law—
and let us be clear: they are—while their agents may be innocent. To get a 
handle on the answer to this question, it is necessary to comprehend that the 
requirements for imposing criminal liability on corporations differ from those 
necessary for imposing criminal liability on individuals. It is significantly 
more difficult to impose criminal liability on individuals than on a 
corporation.20 In the case of corporations, the elements of an offence, both 
the actus reus and the mens rea can be satisfied by conducts and mental states 
of different executives and employees, aggregated and imputed to the firm. 
In contrast, to impose personal liability, all elements must be satisfied by the 
same individual. Hence, it is often impossible to derive the guilt of individual 
agents from the admissions made by a corporation.21 At the same time, the 
relative ease of finding corporations criminally liable constitutes additional 
inducement for them to settle with law enforcement agencies even when it 
requires admitting to wrongdoing by their agents.  
The desire of firms to enter settlements with law enforcement authority is 
perfectly rational. Moreover, they are obligated to do so by law. Presiding 
directors and officers, who are required to decide whether to enter into a 
settlement with the enforcement authority, owe a fiduciary duty to the 
corporation, not to their predecessors. For the reasons we explained, closing 
criminal investigations and receiving credit for cooperating with law 
enforcement authorities are in the best interest of the firm. Hence, the law, by 
requiring directors and officers to put the firm’s interests above all other 
considerations, exacerbates the plight of past employees.  
To address the harsh consequences of the reverse agency problem, we 
propose three mechanisms that can alleviate the plight of innocent directors 
and officers. The first mechanism seeks to amplify the voice of individual 
corporate officers in settlement negotiations by giving them a right to a 
hearing prior to the finalization of a settlement. This mechanism would 
enable individual directors and officers to review settlements and propose 
changes before they are signed. The second mechanism we contemplate is to 
 
reputation in the marketplace, because of the effect on relationship with customers, creditors, 
and the public at large.”). 
19 See infra note 85. 
20 See infra note 83. 
21 See infra notes 80–83. 
8 REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF COMPLIANCE [7-Aug-19 
 
 
give individual directors and officers who were implicated in settlements the 
right to bring an action for a declaratory judgment that could clear them of 
liability.  Doing so will grant innocent directors and officers the power to 
initiate legal actions in order to dispel the suspicions surrounding them and 
preempt derivative actions against them. Our third, and the most far-reaching 
mechanism, is to allow innocent directors and officers the right to sue their 
colleagues who went astray and precipitated a cascade of harms on the 
corporation and its employees.  
Structurally, the Article unfolds in three parts. In Part II, we will discuss 
the rise in enforcement actions against corporations and PDAs, and explain 
how they drive a wedge between the interests of the corporation and its 
directors and officers, mainly former directors and officers. In Part III, we 
will introduce the reverse agency problem and position it within the rich 
conceptual framework of principal-agent conflicts that has been developed 
by corporate law theorists. In part IV, we will advance our proposed solutions 
to the reverse agency problem. A short conclusion will ensue.  
II. THE COMPLIANCE AGE 
We commence our discussion of the reverse agency problem by turning 
the spotlight on a recent trend that changes the face of the corporate world: a 
dramatic increase in the rate and intensity of criminal enforcement actions 
against corporations. Clearly, criminal actions against corporations have been 
with us for a long time. In the last two decades, however, law enforcement 
authorities have stepped up their enforcement efforts against corporations, 
taking them to unprecedented levels. An important corollary of this trend is 
the emergence of vast settlements, running in hundreds of millions of dollars, 
that were struck between corporations and law enforcement agencies.  
These settlements have generated large amounts of money that went into 
the pubic fisc and was used in part to continue the enforcement campaign. 
The enforcement efforts have intensified in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of 2008 and the government bailout of the financial sector.22 In this Part 
 
22 Official statements show that there was an increase in enforcement efforts following 
the financial crisis. See, e.g., Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, Dep’t of 
Just., Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of Law (Sept. 17, 2014) 
(“Our record demonstrates that when the evidence and the law support it, we do not hesitate 
to bring charges against anyone.  Between 2009 and 2013, the Justice Department charged 
more white-collar defendants than during any previous five-year period going back to at least 
1994.”).  However, some studies cast doubt on the accuracy of such statements. See JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT DATA REVEAL 29 PERCENT DROP 
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF CORPORATIONS, 
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/#figure1 (last visited July 9, 2019) (suggesting that 
“the decline in corporate prosecutions” cannot be fully explained by the increase in the use 
of PDAs and may “reflect a general decline in federal prosecution efforts”). It is difficult, if 
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we will discuss the increase in enforcement actions against corporations and 
explain how they transformed the corporate landscape.  
A. The Rise of Enforcement Actions 
Recent years have witnessed a sea change in enforcement actions against 
corporations. The DOJ, SEC and IRS have invested considerable efforts and 
resources in criminal investigations against companies. This trend has grown 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, with some commentators 
speculating that criminal enforcement against corporations provides a cost-
effective method to bring money into the public fisc, and thereby defray, at 
least to some extent, the cost of the bailout. 
The tidal wave of enforcement actions centered on violations of the 
Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA), False Claims Act (FCA), Bank 
Secrecy Act23 has exposed companies to an unprecedented level of liability 
and risk. In the proceeding paragraphs, we will discuss these changes in 
detail. We begin with the FCPA.  
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 to combat 
the spread of corruption in international business transactions.24 Until 1998, the 
FCPA had very little effect on the ground: investigations and prosecutions were 
rare.25 Everything changed in 2005 when FCPA enforcement began in earnest.26 
Nearly seventy percent of DOJ and SEC cases involving the FCPA were commenced 
between 2005-2013.27 The renewed focus of the enforcement authorities on FCPA 
 
not impossible, to evaluate which side is correct because doing so requires an examination 
of the cases declined by federal prosecutors and “[w]e simply do not have good data on such 
cases.” Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail—How Prosecutors Compromise with 
Corporations 254 (2014). 
23 DOJ also increasingly enforces laws and regulations aimed at preventing money 
laundering, environmental and antitrust violations. 
24 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, Stat. 1494 (“to 
make it unlawful for an issuer of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of [the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934] or an issuer required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of such 
Act to make certain payments to foreign officials and other foreign persons, to require such 
issuers to maintain accurate records, and for other purposes.”) 
25 For historical background of FCPA enforcement until the 2000s, see, e.g., Barbara 
Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corruption Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption Is 
Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1093 (2012). See also Brandon L. Garrett, 
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1829 (2011). 
26  See generally Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble, Collateral Shareholder 
Litigation Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1217 
(2012); Roger M. Witten et al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery Controls in 
Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64(3) THE BUSINESS LAWYER 691 (2009); 
Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63(4) THE 
BUSINESS LAWYER 1243 (2008).  
27 THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ECONOMIC IMPACT ON TARGETED FIRMS 1 
(Law & Economics Center of George Mason University School of Law, June 2014). 
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enforcement has led to the voluntary payment of heavy penalties by corporations in 
order to settle these cases.  
The harbinger of things to come is the Siemens AG case. In 2008, Siemens AG 
signed a plea agreement with DOJ’s criminal division, as part of which it agreed to 
pay $800 million to settle allegations of FCPA violations in multiple countries.28 A 
year later, in 2009, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) paid $579 million to the DOJ and 
SEC to resolve a broad investigation of FCPA violations via a plea agreement.29 The 
two largest FCPA enforcement actions in the history came roughly a decade later. 
In 2017, Telia Company AB, a Swedish phone company, agreed to pay $965.8 
million to settle through deferred prosecution agreement U.S. and European criminal 
and civil charges that it paid bribes to win business in Uzbekistan.30 Then, in 2018, 
Petrobras, Brazil's state energy company, entered into a non-prosecution 
agreement with the DOJ that included a criminal penalty of $853.2 million,31 in 
addition to a related settlement with the SEC.  
These enforcement actions have been heralded in lawmakers’ campaigns. 
For example, in 2007, Mark F. Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief of the Fraud 
Section of the DOJ’s Criminal Division, stated in his opening address at the 
ACI (American Conference Institute) FCPA Conference that “2007 is by any 
 
28 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty 
to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined 
Criminal Fines (December 15, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html ( “Coordinated 
Enforcement Actions by DOJ, SEC and German Authorities Result in Penalties of $1.6 
Billion.”). 
29 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to 
Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-crm-112.html; Press Release, SEC, SEC 
Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm.  To gain an idea of the scope of DOJ and 
SEC investigations into FCPA cases, see Gibson Dunn, 2007 Year-End FCPA Update 
(January 4, 2008), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2007-year-end-fcpa-update/ (hereinafter: 
“Gibson Dunn-2007”). Gibson Dunn-2007 lists dozens of FCPA investigations in just 2007 
alone.  
30 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Telia Company AB and Its Uzbek Subsidiary 
Enter Into a Global Foreign Bribery Resolution of More Than $965 Million for Corrupt 
Payments in Uzbekistan (Sep. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telia-company-ab-
and-its-uzbek-subsidiary-enter-global-foreign-bribery-resolution-more-965. The FCPA Top 
Ten List is available at the FCPA Blog at 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2018/9/28/petrobras-smashes-the-top-ten-list-and-we-
explain-why.html (last visited June 10, 2019).  
31 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobras Agrees to 
Pay More Than $850 Million for FCPA Violations (Sep. 27, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/petr-leo-brasileiro-sa-petrobras-agrees-pay-more-850-
million-fcpa-violations. 
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measure a landmark year in the fight against foreign bribery.”32 A year later, 
at a speech he gave at an American Bar Association panel on foreign bribery 
about the dramatic increase in the number of FCPA cases, he promised that 
the trend will continue.33 Mendelson’s promise was echoed by Lanny Breuer, 
the head of the DOJ Criminal Division, who made it clear in November of 
2010, that “FCPA enforcement is stronger than it’s ever been — and getting 
stronger.”34  
These were not empty words. In 2008 the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) created a unit dedicated to FCPA investigations;35 and in 2010 the SEC 
also formed a specialized unit within its enforcement division to focus on 
these cases.36 Finally, in November 2017, the DOJ published a new FCPA 
Corporate Enforcement Policy intended to encourage companies to 
voluntarily disclose misconduct and cooperate with enforcement 
authorities.37  
Chart 1 below illustrates this point regarding enforcement actions made by 
the DOJ and the SEC of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, between 1978 and 
2017:38 
 
32 Gibson Dunn-2007, supra note 29 (describing that Frederic D. Firestone, an Associate 
Director in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, followed Mendelsohn’s words by saying 
“ditto from the SEC”). 
33 Mendelsohn Says Criminal Bribery Prosecutions Doubled in 2007, 22 CORPORATE 
CRIME REPORTER 36(1) (September 16, 2008).  
34 Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, Address at the 24th National Conference 
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), 
www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html (“We are in a new era 
of FCPA enforcement; and we are here to stay.”). 
35 FBI, Public Corruption, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/public-corruption. 
36 Andrew Ceresney, Keynote Address at the International Conference on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-
spch111913ac. 
37 United States Attorney’s Manual 9-47.120 FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy, 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download. 
38  Gibson Dunn, 2017 Year-End FCPA Update (January 2, 2018), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-fcpa-update/ (hereinafter: “Gibson Dunn-
2017”). 




A similar dynamic can be traced in the enforcement of the False Claims 
Act (FCA).39 Recently, the FCA has become a major weapon in the arsenal 
of the enforcement authorities.40 The act prohibits any person or organization 
from defrauding the government on the material terms of its receipt of 
government money or certification. FCA enforcement actions received public 
attention, when, in 2009, the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer agreed to pay $2.3 
billion to settle FCA civil and criminal allegations after Pfizer was accused 
of promoting the sale of certain drugs that the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) refused to approve due to safety concerns. 41  In 
emphasizing the magnitude of the penalties FCA infringers should expect to 
face, Assistant Attorney General Tony West said, “[t]his civil settlement and 
plea agreement by Pfizer represent yet another example of what penalties will 
be faced when a pharmaceutical company puts profits ahead of patient 
welfare.”42 In the same year, global pharma company Eli Lilly paid $1.4 
billion under the FCA to resolve a DOJ claim that it had violated the FCA by 
 
39 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729-3733 (2012). 
40 As Benjamin C. Mizer, the head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division announced 
in December 2016, “Congress amended the False Claims Act 30 years ago to give the 
government a more effective tool against false and fraudulent claims against federal 
programs [and] [a]n astonishing 60 percent of those recoveries were obtained in the last eight 
years.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion from 
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (December 14, 2016).  
41 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care 
Fraud Settlement in Its History: Pfizer To Pay $2.3 Billion For Fraudulent Marketing (Sept. 
2, 2009). 
42 Id.  
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illegally promoting one of its drugs for non-FDA uses, such as for treating 
dementia, aggression, and generalized sleep disorder.43 Companies from the 
healthcare sector remained the focus of the DOJ and in 2012, Abbott 
Laboratories paid $1.5 billion to resolve criminal and civil FCA 
investigations arising from its unlawful promotion of one of its drugs for non-
FDA approved uses.44 Finally, in 2013, Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay 
$2.2 billion to settle FCA allegations that J&J promoted drugs for uses not 
approved as safe and effective by the FDA.45  The rise in FCA enforcement 
actions continues, as is evident from the fact that in 2017 alone the DOJ 
recovered over $3.7 billion from FCA related investigations,46 and in 2018 
alone the DOJ recovered over $2.8 billion.47 We do not expect this trend to 
wane in the foreseeable future. 
The Bank Secrecy Act, together with Anti-Money Laundering (AML) 
laws, also provide a launching pad for enforcement actions. In this context, 
the U.S. regulators have raised their efforts to ensure the compliance of 
financial institutions with the Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of 
Currency and Foreign Transaction Act of 197048 (commonly referred to as 
the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws. This 
campaign is led by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—
the Treasury’s lead agency for combatting money laundering. The SEC and 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) have also indicated 
their intent to focus their resources on AML violations. 49  Naturally, the 
primary targets of the aforementioned authorities are banks and depository 
institutions. The enforcement actions were quick to come with large 
settlements. In December 2012, HSBC Holdings plc entered into a deferred 
 
43 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Eli Lilly Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to 
Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009). 
44 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to Resolve Criminal 
& Civil Investigations of Off-label Promotion of Depakote (May 7, 2012). 
45 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Johnson & Johnson to Pay More Than $2.2 Billion to 
Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov 4, 2013). 
46 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion from 
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017).  
47 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion from 
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018). 
48  31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seg. 
49 See SEC, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Examination Priorities 
for 2017 (Jan. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-
program-priorities-2017.pdf, at 4 (“Money laundering and terrorist financing continue to be 
risk areas that are considered in our examination program.”); FINRA, 2017 Annual 
Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2017-regulatory-and-examination-priorities-
letter.pdf, at 8 (“In 2017, FINRA will continue to focus on firms’ anti-money laundering 
programs, especially those areas where we have observed shortcomings.”).  
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prosecution agreement, under which it agreed to pay a total amount of $1.2 
billion, in addition to $665 million civil penalties, to regulators including the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the 
Treasury Department.  
On February 12, 2018, U.S. Bancorp (“USB”) and the Office of the U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York entered into a DPA.50 The DPA 
resolved criminal charges against USB, consisting of two alleged violations of the 
Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) by USB’s subsidiary, U.S. Bank National Association, 
for willfully failing to maintain an adequate anti-money laundering program and 
willfully failing to file a Suspicious Activity Report. The DPA specified that USB 
would pay the United States $528 million. 
Between January 2002 and December 2015, 76.3% of AML/BSA 
enforcement cases were directed at banks and depository institutions.51 In the 
years since the financial crisis of 2008, the world’s biggest banks have been 
fined $321 billion.52 
It certainly appears as if AML/BSA enforcement is going to remain at the 
forefront of the U.S. legislative and regulatory priorities in coming years. 
Recently, Congress has shown interest in updating AML laws by proposing 
multiple new bills53 and engaging in a number of discussions.54 Similar to the 
examples of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the False Claims Act 
discussed above, the Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering are 
classic examples of a law and regulation that are focused on specific 
industries.  
B. Pretrial Diversion Agreements 
 
50 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 18-cr-150 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
12, 2018), [hereinafter U.S. Bancorp DPA]; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan 
U.S. Attorney Announces Criminal Charges Against U.S. Bancorp for Violations of the Bank Secrecy 
Act (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-
criminal-charges-against-us-bancorp-violations-bank. 
51  Dr. Sharon Brown-Hruska, Developments in Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money 
Laundering Enforcement and Litigation, NERA Economic Consulting 4 (June 2016), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/PUB_Developments_BSA_AM
L_Lit-06.16.pdf, 
52  Gavin Finch, World’s Biggest Banks Fined $321 Billion Since Financial Crisis, 
BLOOMBERG (March 2, 2017). 
53  See, e.g., H.R. 4373, 115th Cong. (2017), 
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr4373/BILLS-115hr4373ih.pdf; S. 1241, 115th Cong. 
(2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/s1241/BILLS-115s1241is.pdf. 
54  See, e.g., Combating Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit Finance: 
Opportunities to Reform and Strengthen BSA Enforcement: Hearing Before the Comm. on 
Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/combating-money-laundering-and-other-forms-
of-illicit-finance-opportunities-to-reform-and-strengthen-bsa-enforcement. 
15 REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF COMPLIANCE [7-Aug-19 
 
 
1. The Growth in the Use of PDAs 
As explained above, over the last two decades, the number of corporate 
criminal investigations has increased exponentially. As noted by Jennifer 
Arlen and Marcel Kahan, “corporate criminal enforcement in the United 
States has undergone a dramatic transformation,” 55  and the enhanced 
enforcement efforts brought about a corresponding increase in the number of 
PDAs.56 A related explanation for the rise in the use of the PDAs focuses on 
the Thompson Memo released by the DOJ in 2003, which instructed federal 
prosecutions to defer prosecution if corporations agreeing to cooperate fully 
with investigations led by the DOJ, or its agents, “including, if necessary, the 
waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection.”57  
Lastly, the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2005, as a consequence of the 
criminal legal proceedings against it, 58  also explains how PDAs have 
“skyrocketed” since 2005.59 Chart 2 below illustrates the growing use of 
PDAs over the last decade:60 
 
55 Arlen & Kahan, supra note 5, at 324. 
56 Recall, that PDAs include both Non Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs). The main difference between them is that whereas a DPA 
involves the filing of charges in federal court, a NPA does not. See Cindy R. Alexander & 
Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlements: An Empirical Perspective 
on Non-Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 545 (2015). 
57 See Memorandum from Dep. Atty. Gen. Larry Thompson to United States Attorneys: 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003). See also infra 
notes 129–130. 
58 See infra notes 95–97. 
59 Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1385, 1407 (2011).  
60 Gibson Dunn, 2018 Year-End update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements and 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.gibsondunn.com/2018-year-
end-npa-dpa-update/ (hereinafter: “Gibson Dunn-2018”). See also Gideon Mark, Private 
FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L. J. 419, 434-5 (2012) (“[I]n the 21st century the use of 
DPAs ‘has evolved rapidly to the point that they are now the primary tool in DOJ’s efforts 
to combat corporate crime.’”). 
This trend is not unique to the U.S. See Peter Reilly, Sweetheart Deals, Deferred 
Prosecution, and Making a Mockery of the Criminal Justice System: U.S Corporate DPAs 
Rejected on Many Fronts, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113, 1140 (2019) (describing the growing use 
of PDA in other countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom). See also 
Samuel Rubenfeld, U.K. to Move Forward with Deferred-Prosecution Agreements, WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruptioncurrents/2012/10/23/uk-to-
move-forward-with-deferred-prosecution-agreements/. 





Instead of prosecuting cases to a final judgment, enforcement authorities 
have displayed a preference to enter into PDAs with public companies.61 
Under these pretrial agreements, corporations agree to admit to wrongdoing, 
pay considerable amounts, sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars, 62 
undertake various corrective measures to prevent future lapses in compliance, 
and in exchange, have the prosecution against them deferred for a certain 
period of time. If the agreement was performed at the end of that period, the 
prosecution will be dropped.63  
 
61 Former head of the DOJ Lanny A. Breuer stated that DPAs had “become a mainstay 
of white collar criminal law enforcement.” Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t 
of Justice, Address at the New York City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-new-
york-city-bar-association (last visited June 22, 2019). See also Koehler, supra note 16, at 
515-527 (describing the dominant use of DPAs and NPAs in FCPA enforcement); Julie R. 
O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corporations” Charging 
Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means for the Purposes of the 
Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 77 (2014) (“The biggest change in 
corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years has been the plunge in criminal 
convictions of large organizations, and the DOJ’s consistent use of [deferred prosecution] 
agreements to dispose of criminal wrongdoing.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform 
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 855 (2007).  
62 Gibson Dunn-2018, supra note 60 (showing how in 2018, in the U.S., “the monetary 
recoveries skyrocketed to nearly $8.1 billion”). 
63 Rachel Delaney, Congressional Legislation: The Next Step for Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 875, 878 (2009). 
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The company under investigation and the enforcement authority, 
typically the DOJ, usually enter into the agreement following an internal 
investigation led by the company itself with the assistance of a leading audit 
firm64 approved by the DOJ, which makes a forensic examination to validate 
the data obtained from the company’s sources. In some cases, the DOJ forces 
the company to nominate an external monitor to supervise the collection and 
analysis of the data. This process includes the collection and review of 
thousands of documents and emails, and, in some cases, millions of pages of 
documents produced and submitted to the DOJ. Within this process, the 
company must collect and translate multiple documents, conduct internal 
interviews, and make representations reflecting the result of the internal 
investigation to the DOJ. After completing the negotiation, a PDA will be 
signed.  
PDAs characteristically impose burdensome requirements on companies, 
including the establishment of a sophisticated and comprehensive 
compliance program,65 high-level personnel changes such as termination of 
high, mid, and low level officers,66 business changes,67 and the appointment 
of an external corporate monitor approved by the enforcement authority for 
the probation period (usually 24 to 36 months).68  
Also, PDAs include a statement of facts in which the company admits to 
the offence that it is accused of in a very detailed manner.69 The admissions 
included in agreements are described by Richard Epstein as “confessions of 
 
64 Typically, the audit company will be one of the “big four,” namely, Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). 
65  Arlen & Kahan, supra note 5, at 342 (pointing out that “from 2008 to 2014, 
approximately 82 percent of the PDAs entered into by the DOJ Criminal Division or the US 
Attorneys’ Offices imposed compliance program mandates . . . .”). 
66 Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993-2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 34 
(2014) (found that out of 271 PDAs executed between 1993 and 2013, 30 percent mandated 
changes in senior management). 
67  Id (found that out of 271 PDAs executed between 1993 and 2013, 30 percent 
mandated business changes). 
68 Arlen & Kahan, supra note 5, at 342 (showing that “from 2008 to 2014 . . . more than 
30 percent [of the PDAs entered into by the DOJ Criminal Division or the US Attorneys’ 
Offices]  imposed outside monitors . . . .”). See also Alexander & Cohen, supra note 56, at 
545; Court E. Golumbic  & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail Effect” and the Impact on 
the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1311–12, 
1320 (2014); Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 61, at 898; Vikramaditya 
Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 
MICH L. REV. 1713, 1720-26 (2007); Veronica Root, The Monitor-"Client" Relationship, 
100 VA. L. REV. 523 (2014). 
69 Arlen & Kahan, supra note 5, at 334. 
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a Stalinist purge trial.”70 The company must state  that the facts set forth in 
the statement of facts are “true” and “accurate” and agree that it shall not, 
through its attorneys, employees or other agents, make any public statement, 
in litigation or otherwise, contradicting the statement of facts, as long as they 
speak on behalf of the company.71  
The consequences for the directors and officers implicated in the 
investigation are far reaching and dire. Naturally, the admissions made by the 
company affect them. To be sure, the admissions of the company do not 
formally bind the directors and officers, but the attribution of wrongful 
actions and omissions to corporate officers have profound implications for 
their career. If the investigation focuses on the acts and omissions of current 
directors and officers, they can affect to some degree the admissions made by 
the corporation about their actions or omissions. If, however, the 
investigation concentrates on the actions and omissions of past directors and 
officers, they have absolutely no influence on the admissions made by the 
company. They are not directly involved in the negotiations leading to the 
PDA and have no say in the process. We will discuss the ramifications of this 
reality to corporate law and theory in Part III.A. 
2. The Pressure to Settle 
At this point, readers may wonder why powerful corporations sign PDAs. 
PDAs are essentially plea bargains.72 There exists a voluminous literature 
that explains the motivation of individuals to enter plea bargains. Many 
individual defendants simply do not have the financial resources to fight the 
charges facing them. Corporations, especially public ones, clearly do not 
have this problem. So why sign? Although it is true that in the typical case 
corporations have superior financial resources to individuals, one cannot infer 
from this fact that corporations can afford a prolonged legal battle against the 
state or that it is in their best interest to do so. For the reasons we will explain 
below, corporations, too, have a very strong incentive to settle. It is no 
accident that a considerable number of criminal investigations against 
corporations end in an agreement.  
Corporations have a clear preference to enter into a PDA with the 
enforcement authorities due to a combination of legal and economic reasons. 
 
70 Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J. Nov. 28, 2006 
(“The agreements often read like the confessions of a Stalinist purge trial, as battered 
corporations recant their past sins and submit to punishments wildly in excess of any 
underlying offense. . . .  [Their use] erodes the most elementary protections of the criminal 
law, by turning the prosecutor into judge and jury, thus undermining our principles of 
separation of powers.”). 
71 Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 925 (2009).  
72 For a detailed discussion of the differences between PDAs and plea agreements, see 
Section II.B.3. 
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Begin with the legal reasons, imposing criminal liability on a corporation is 
easier than successfully prosecuting individuals. Unlike the case with 
individuals where all elements of the offense must be performed by one 
individual, in the case of corporations, the elements may be provided by 
different corporate agents. As a consequence, a corporation can be charged 
with a criminal offense even if none of its employees can be accused of the 
offense. The law employs two doctrines to create this result. First and 
foremost, when the DOJ chooses to charge a company with a violation of a 
federal statute, it is going to largely rely on the doctrine of respondeat 
superior. Under this doctrine, the company may be found liable for acts of its 
employees if they were acting within the scope of their authority at least in 
part for the benefit of the corporation.73  
This doctrine has been construed in a very broad manner by the courts. 
First, the respondeat superior doctrine enables the imposition of liability on 
the company, regardless of the position of the employee who violated the 
law.74 Second, under this doctrine, a company may be held liable “even if an 
employee is violating express corporate policy.”75 Third, the requirement that 
the employee acted within the scope of his authority has been “defined to 
mean ‘in the corporation's behalf in performance of the agent's general line 
of work,’ including ‘not only that which has been authorized by the 
corporation, but also that which outsiders could reasonably assume the agent 
would have authority to do.’" 76  Fourth, when examining whether the 
employee acted with the intent to benefit the company, it is the intent that 
matters, rather than the actual benefit for the company.77 Interestingly, it is 
no defense that the employee acted primarily for his personal benefit,78 
except when it could be proven that the employee acted exclusively for his 
own benefit.79  
The second doctrine that may be used by the DOJ is the collective 
knowledge doctrine. This doctrine makes it possible to impose criminal 
 
73 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); 
United States v. Singh, 518 F. 3d 236, 249-50 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Potter, 463 
F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Unites States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550, 560 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Unites States v. Sun Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
74  Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962) 
(“[C]orporation may be criminally bound by the acts of subordinate, even menial, 
employees.”). See also U.S. v. Dye Const. Co., 510 F.2d 78, 82 (10th Cir. 1975); U.S. v. 
Ionia Management S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 309–310 (2d Cir. 2009). 
75 City of Vernon v. S. California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1369–70 (9th Cir. 1992). 
76 U.S. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Automated 
Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985). 
77 U.S. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985). 
78 U.S. v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 138 F.3d 961, 970–71 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
79 Standard Oil Co. of Tex. V. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1962); U.S. v. 
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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liability on corporations, even in cases where no individual has committed all 
the components of the offense.80 Under this doctrine, the knowledge and 
conduct of multiple employees can be imputed, in aggregation, to the 
company.81 In this way, courts can impose criminal liability on the company 
even if no individual employee had the mens rea necessary to prove the 
offense.82 Taken together, the responeat superior doctrine and the collective 
knowledge doctrine make companies much more vulnerable to criminal 
convictions, compared to individuals.83  
The business reasons to sign a PDA are even weightier.  Once the 
company is accused of violating the law, not to mention convicted, it must 
invariably expend valuable resources on the investigation and incur 
significant losses. The expenses accumulate as the investigation continues. 
Hence, the company has an inherent incentive to close the investigation.  
The opening of an investigation requires the firm to allocate managerial and 
legal resources to the matter. The investigation comes on top of the 
company’s standard business, which means that the company must employ 
its human capital in a different way to address the exigencies posed by the 
investigation.84 But this is only the beginning of the company’s ordeal.  
Because enforcement authorities condition entering into a settlement on 
full cooperation on the part of the company, and give companies credit for 
cooperating with the investigating authorities, which comes in the form of a 
reduced fine, corporations have a strong incentive to pay law firms to conduct 
 
80 United States v. Bank of New Eng., N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855–856 (1st Cir. 1987); 
United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. W.Va. 1974). 
81 Id. (“Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific 
duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those components 
constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant whether 
employees administering one component of an operation know the specific activities of 
employees administering another aspect of the operation.”).  
82 Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 114–115 (2006). 
83 Developments in the Law, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through 
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1248 (1979) (“Thus, proving that a corporate 
defendant committed the illegal act is in practice substantially easier than an individual 
prosecution. Courts have also found the requirement of corporate criminal intent satisfied 
where no agent's criminal intent has been shown. Corporations have been convicted of crimes 
requiring knowledge on the basis of the ‘collective knowledge’ of the employees as a group, 
even though no single employee possessed sufficient information to know that the crime was 
being committed.”). 
84 See, e.g., Olaf Storbeck, Deutche Bank Investors Fear Criminal Probe Will Hinder 
Turnaround, FINANCIAL TIMES (December 3, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/03d9685c-
f632-11e8-af46-2022a0b02a6c (“Investors in Deutche Bank are concerned that the criminal 
investigation into the suspected money laundering activities of the lender’s wealth 
management unit will make it harder for chief executive Christian Sewing to execute his 
crucial turnaround agenda.”).  
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an internal investigation within the firm and report the findings to the DOJ or 
SEC.85  Since firms are under enhanced scrutiny at this point, they must 
ensure that the internal investigation is comprehensive and uncompromising. 
Firms are expected to provide full access to privileged materials, even those 
that come under the attorney-client privilege,86 and align “their interests with 
those of” DOJ or SEC’s attorneys.87  
In global companies, the cost of conducting the said investigation runs in 
hundreds of millions of dollars.88 If ultimately no agreement is reached with 
the enforcement authorities, the resources spent on the investigation will be 
wasted. Hence, once a decision on an internal investigation is made, the 
company will try its best to sign a PDA.  
In addition to the direct costs of the investigation, criminal enforcement 
inflicts indirect costs on firms in the form of reputational harm,89 loss of 
 
85 See, e.g., MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 183 
(2014) (“The above general framework best demonstrates the ‘carrots’ embedded in the 
[Sentencing] Guidelines . . . In short, a company subject to FCPA scrutiny will receive a 
lower culpability score based on voluntary disclosure, cooperation and acceptance of 
responsibility, which then yields a lower multipliers, which then yields a lower fine range.”). 
The dynamic described by Professor Koehler is relevant not just related to FCPA 
investigations but to all investigations. See also Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation 
and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 316–18 (2007) 
(describing the approach of enforcement authorities, which leads to a very tight relationship 
between calculation of fines and the level of cooperation provided by companies, as “carrots” 
and “sticks”). 
86 Infra notes 129–130. 
87 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: 
An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2015) 
(explaining how AIG cooperated with the then New York Attorney General Mr. Eliot 
Spitzer). 
88 See supra note 15. 
89  See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 61, at 855 
(“Organizations feared the catastrophic punitive fines and severe reputational consequences 
of a conviction—what one court described as a ‘matter of life and death’”). See also Jonathan 
M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 
J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 581 (2008) (examining 585 companies that were targeted by the SEC 
enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from 1978 through 2002 and revealing 
that these companies lose 38 percent of their market value after news of their misconduct 
was reported); Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms 
Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, J. L. & Econ. 757, 759 (1993) (using data on 132 
cases of corporate fraud between 1978 and 1987 to find that the loss in value of common 
stock of affected companies after “initial press reports of allegations or investigations of 
corporate fraud against . . . government agencies . . . is 5.05 percent, or $40.0 million.”); 
David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the 
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MARYLAND L. REV. 1295, 1335–6 (2013) (“. . . 
Perhaps most significantly of all, criminal prosecution has a stigmatizing effect . . . .” ). 
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business opportunities and an increased civil litigation risk.90 The first two 
costs are distinct, but related. A criminal investigation can irreversibly tarnish 
the reputation of a firm, causing it to lose much of its hard-earned goodwill. 
It creates a cloud of doubt that hovers over the operation of the firm, making 
it difficult for the firm to attract new capital and to maintain its client base.91 
The constant press coverage that accompanies the investigation often 
augments the concerns about the stability of the company and casts doubt on 
its future.92 This, in turn, makes it harder for the company to pursue new 
business opportunities. It also forces the company to funnel resources into the 
maintenance of business relationships. Once word of the investigation goes 
out, financial institutions, suppliers, employees and business partners that 
depend on the suspect firm will seek additional information about its future 
and may demand assurances of its long-term sustainability.93 In parallel, they 
may pursue other business opportunities that they deem safer.94 
An often-cited example that demonstrates these threats is the case of 
Arthur Andersen.95 The story began in 2002, when Andersen was charged 
 
90 See Greenblum, supra note 11, at 1885 (“Collateral consequences facing corporations 
convicted of a felony are perhaps just as diverse, though more detrimental, than those that 
attach to individuals. Corporations can be debarred from government contracting and have 
their professional license revoked.”). See also Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, 
Corporate Criminal Prosecution In a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo In Theory 
and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1165 (2006) (“‘For health care providers . . . who 
rely extensively on federal programs for reimbursement, exclusion is the equivalent of a 
corporate death penalty.’ The authority to impose this powerful sanction lies with the U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services’ Office of Inspector General . . . . Because a 
number of health care convictions trigger mandatory exclusion, companies facing criminal 
investigation in this [healthcare] industry necessarily focus on this derivative danger.”). 
91 See Uhlmann, supra note 89, at 1264 (“Reputational harm can discourage investment 
in a company”). 
92 See Jamie L. Gustafson, Cracking Down on White-Collar Crime: An Analysis of the 
Recent Trend of Severe Sentences for Corporate Officers, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685, 697 
(2007) (“[P]ublic interest in corporate scandal spiked as a result of the media coverage.”). 
Moreover, such an increase in public attention has been translated into an “understanding, 
thoughtful outcry against white-collar crime.” Jonathan D. Glater, Mad as Hell: Hard Time 





93 Koehler, supra note 16, at 510 (“A criminal investigation and indictment alone could 
have enormous adverse consequences even if a company were ultimately acquitted at trial.”) 
94 See id., at 1264-65 (“Reputational harm also can hamper relationships in the broader 
business community.”) 
95 See Cindy A. Schipani, The Future of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate 
Criminal Investigations, 34 DEL. J. CORP. 921, 925-927 (2009). See also Elizabeth K. 
Ainslie, Indicting Corporation Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 
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with a count of obstruction of justice, related to its auditing of Enron. 
Andersen was accused of destroying documents in order to impede the 
investigation of Enron, which was led by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The district court convicted Andersen and the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction. Finally, in 2005 the 
Supreme Court of the United States reversed Andersen’s conviction, but it 
was too late. In 2002, Andersen lost its Certified Public Accountants’ license 
(since the SEC does not accept audits from convicted firms), and in 2005, 
although the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, Andersen had no chance 
to reclaim its title of one of the “big five” accounting firms.96  The dire 
consequences of the investigation and conviction were described in 2002 by 
Eric Holder, who served as the Attorney General of the United States between 
2009 and 2015:  
“Nevertheless, for a firm that trades on its 
reputation, and that was already facing an 
exodus of clients, the effect of the indictment 
and conviction was close to a death sentence. 
Thousands of innocent employees now find 
themselves out of jobs and, for no good reason, 
their professional reputations scarred. The 
survival of Andersen itself is in great doubt. Is 
this an appropriate outcome? I'm not sure.”97  
The story of Arthur Anderson demonstrates why entering into a PDA with 
the enforcement authorities as quickly as possible is the top priority of firms. 
Companies under a criminal investigation must strive to reach a settlement at 
all cost; waiting is simply not a viable option for most firms, even if it can 
ultimately lead to acquittal. The market reaction to a criminal investigation 
against a firm can be harsher than any legal punishment it may face. Dragging 
out the investigation is a losing strategy from every aspect. The longer the 
investigation, the higher the price for a company in terms of lost business 
opportunities. All the while, the legal expenses continue to add up. Hence, 
 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 109 (2006); Golumbic  & Lichy, supra note 68, at 1306-8; Peter J. 
Henning, The Organizational Guidelines: R.I.P.?, 116 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 312, 314 
(2007); Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The 
Department of Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 14-15 (2006). 
96 Id.  
97 Eric Holder, Don't Indict WorldCom, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2002, at A14. See also 
Alex B. Heller, Corporate Death Penalty: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Indictment of 
SAC Capital, 22 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 763, 763-64 (“In Andersen’s case, the indictment 
alone was a corporate death sentence, even before adjudication. The Anderson case and the 
lessons learned in its aftermath have been regarded as a turning point in government 
decisions to charge corporate offenders, especially in the financial services industry.”). 
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the company faces a reality in which its resources are dwindling, while its 
expenses are mounting.  
From both perspectives, the best response to a criminal investigation is to 
strive to settle it expeditiously, almost at all cost. The alternative, as the story 
of Arthur Anderson reminds us, may be the demise of the corporation. The 
desire to settle makes perfect sense for the company, but for the reasons we 
will explain in Section III below, it comes at a dear price for the individual 
directors and officers. 
3. Plea Agreements 
Similar dynamics that characterize PDAs also arise, albeit to a lesser 
extent, in the context of plea agreements.98 In parallel to the increase in the 
use of PDAs, classic corporate plea agreements continue to be a useful tool 
for enforcement authorities.99 The main difference between PDAs and plea 
agreements is that under a plea agreement the defendant is convicted of a 
crime, whereas under a DPA or an NPA, the defendant is not convicted of 
any crime.100  
Furthermore, there are additional differences, as well. First, courts have a 
potentially more significant role in overseeing plea agreements. Granted, 
both plea agreements and DPAs may require court approval. Yet, there is a 
difference between a court’s role in reviewing DPAs and its role in evaluating 
plea agreements. As stated by Judge Srinivasan of the D.C. Circuit in the 
famous case of Fokker: “the context of a DPA is markedly different. Unlike a plea 
agreement—and more like a dismissal under Rule 48(a)—a DPA involves no formal 
judicial action imposing or adopting its terms.”101 It should be added that unlike 
 
98 Alexander & Cohen, supra note 56, at 538. 
99 Id., at 562 (reporting that 486 corporate criminal settlements were signed between 
1997 and 2011 by the DOJ and public companies (or their affiliates), and 329 of these 
settlements were plea agreements). See also Data & Documents, CORPORATE PROSECUTION 
REGISTRY, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-
registry/browse/browse.html (set “U.S. Public Company?” field as “Yes” and then search 
Disposition Type field for “DP,” “NP,” and “plea.”) (reporting that 361 corporate criminal 
settlements were signed between 1992 and 2019 by federal agencies and public companies, 
among which 167 are plea agreements). 
100 See Greenblum, supra note 11, at 1869 (“A guilty plea [in plea bargaining] results in 
a conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the offender had been 
convicted in a trial.” (citation omitted)); Cindy R. Alexander & Jennifer Arlen, Does 
Conviction Matter? The Reputational and Collateral Effects of Corporate Crime, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOKS IN CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE SERIES (Jennifer Arlen eds., 
2018), (“DPAs lack the stigmatizing effect of a corporate conviction”); Cindy R. Alexander 
& Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Non-Prosecution of Corporations: Toward a Model of Cooperation 
and Leniency, 96 N.C. L. REV. 859, 862 (2018) (“Because neither the NPA nor the DPA 
entails the corporate defendant pleading guilty, we refer to them as non-plea settlements.”) 
101 United States v. Fokker Services B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 746 (D.C. Cir. 2016). See also, 
Id. at 744-5 (“Whatever may be the precise contours of that authority of a court to confirm 
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DPAs, NPAs, the other type of PDAs, do not require court approval and do 
not come under judicial scrutiny at all, even though they too contain broad 
admissions of guilt by firms. The weakened role of judicial oversight in PDA 
takes away some of the bargaining power wielded by law enforcement 
authorities in negotiations of plea agreements.102  
Second, in the case of plea agreements, some or much of the fact finding 
is done by the court, depending on the stage at which the plea agreement is 
entered. This may ameliorate the tendency of enforcement agencies to 
attribute blame to a large group of directors and officers collectively and 
indiscriminately, without even referring to them by name.  
Third, indeed, both plea agreements and PDAs include factual admissions 
and waiver of rights. Still, as reported by Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. 
Cohen in their empirical study, PDAs are more likely than plea agreements 
to include requirements to waive privilege.103 Finally, “over 91% of DPAs 
and 79% of NPAs are found to require an agreement to the admissibility of a 
statement of facts and prior testimony or statements, compared to 38% of all 
plea agreements.”104 
Despite these differences, PDAs and plea agreements put companies 
under enormous pressure to please the relevant enforcement authorities in 
order to avoid a catastrophic result for the company. Toward this end, 
corporations are willing to disregard the interests of present, especially past 
employees, making them scapegoats for the company’s failure and not going 
into the trouble of distinguishing among those who sinned and those who did 
not. This gives rise to the reverse agency problem. 
 
that a DPA's conditions are aimed to assure the defendant's good conduct, it does not permit 
the court to impose its own views about the adequacy of the underlying criminal charges.”); 
Criminal Law—Separation of Powers—D.C. Circuit Holds That Courts May Not Reject 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements Based on the Inadequacy of Charging Decisions or 
Agreement Conditions, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1055 (2017); James M. Anderson & Ivan 
Waggoner, The Changing Role of Criminal Law in Controlling Corporate Behavior, THE 
RAND CORPORATION 62 (2014), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR412.html 
(“But because DPAs and NPAs are typically negotiated and executed prior to the indictment, 
there is no judicial oversight over the terms of such agreements, so prosecutors do not have 
to worry about the risk of a judge rejecting a plea agreement or the terms of probation.”); 
Epstein, supra note 70 (“[DPA agreements can] turn[] the prosecutor into judge and jury, 
thus undermining our principles of separation of powers.”); Peter R. Reilly, Corporate 
Deferred Prosecution as Discretionary Injustice, UTAH. L. REV. 839, 871 (2017) (“district 
courts have a long history of competently reviewing plea agreements.”). But see Darryl 
Brown, The Judicial Role in Criminal Charging and Plea Bargaining, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
63 (2017) (explaining how judge play a passive role in approving plea agreements). 
102 Reilley, supra note 101, at 869 (“in the context of a DPA, the prosecutor gets to 
control all those checks and balances that in trials or plea agreements would be controlled by 
judges, juries, and the watching public”).  
103 Alexander & Cohen, supra note 56, at 587. 
104 Id.  
26 REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF COMPLIANCE [7-Aug-19 
 
 
III. THE REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM 
Companies’ desire to reach a settlement with enforcement authorities 
gives rise to a hitherto unobserved phenomenon, which we call “the reverse 
agency problem.” For the reasons we detailed in Part II, companies under a 
criminal investigation are willing to sacrifice their directors and officers in 
order to reach a quick settlement that will bring the investigation to a close. 
The reverse agency problem is the mirror image of the famous managerial 
agency problem identified by Berle and Means. Berle and Means observed 
that the structure of public corporations allow directors and officers to 
promote their narrow self-interest at the expense of the shareholders.105 This 
insight has had an unparallel impact on corporate law scholarship and it is 
undeniably correct for corporations in the ordinary course of business.  
The opening of a criminal investigation against the firm gives rise to a 
new agency problem. In order to save the corporation and its shareholders 
from a long criminal prosecution process and a severe sanction at the end of 
it, corporations are willing to admit to wrongdoing in order to cut their losses 
and put the investigation behind them.106 En route to this result, corporations 
are willing to attribute various acts and omissions to their directors and 
officers, as required by the law enforcement agencies. We do not criticize this 
behavior. It is perfectly rational. More importantly, settlements maximize 
value for the shareholders.107 Yet, it comes at hefty price for the directors and 
officers, and often other employees, who are expected to take one for the team 
and live with the consequences of the settlement.  
 
105 See discussion, infra, text accompanying note 114. 
106 See Richard Cassin, What’s Wrong With Corporate Criminal Liability?, THE FCPA 
BLOG (Jan. 7, 2009, 7:02 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/1/8/whats-wrong-with-
corporate-criminal-liability.html (“That way, organizations threatened with criminal 
prosecution might feel less compelled to rush into settlements with the DOJ that ‘sell out 
individuals within the company.’”); Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & John-Michael Seibler, All Stick and 
No Carrot: The Yates Memorandum and Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 STETSON L. REV. 
7, 31 (2016) (“[C]orporations have gone along with the government’s proposal because the 
alternative—a conviction—can amount ‘to a virtual death sentence for business entities.’”). 
107 Compare Cunningham, supra note 87, at 20 (explaining how “[f]rom the perspective 
of economic theory, the adverse collateral consequences [of corporate conviction] are 
essentially negative externalities, and DPAs are designed to avoid those.”), with the argument 
that settlement under pressure may harm shareholders, such as Jenny Anderson, A.I.G. Is 
Expected to Offer $1.6 Billion to Settle With Regulators, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2006) (last 
visited June 20, 2019) (providing the statement of Howard Opinsky, a spokesman for 
Maurice R. Greenberg, who served as the Chairman and CEO of AIG that settled in 2005 
with the SEC for $1.6 Billion: “Shareholders lose when companies choose to settle 
investigations motivated by political ambition, fueled by threats and settled out of fear … 
Even if all the allegations were to be believed, a settlement of this magnitude is merely a 
political trophy for the attorney general and totally disproportionate to the impact of the 
alleged misconduct.”).  
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As we will show, these consequences are severe. Critically, the 
admissions implicating corporate officers should not be presumed to be 
accurate. They are merely a means to secure a settlement with the law 
enforcement authorities.108 The directors and officers who are subject to the 
agreement and its statement of facts, often do not have a say in the negotiation 
process and even when they do, their voices get muffled.109 The interest of 
the shareholders takes precedence over the directors’ and officers’. For this 
reason, we decided to dub this conflict of interest “the reverse agency 
problem.” In the paragraphs to come, we will explore the effects of criminal 
investigations, in general, and settlements, in particular, on corporate agents 
and highlight the dynamics and costs resulting therefrom.    
If the investigation results in an agreement or an indictment, the company 
involved is likely to face demands from shareholders to file civil actions 
against the directors and officers implicated in the investigation.110 The facts 
stated in the agreement or in the indictment provide a fertile ground for the 
filing of derivative suits against the directors and officers. After all, they 
contain long and detailed descriptions of wrongdoing by the company’s 
employees and managers, and oversight failure by the directors. 
The company can respond to such demands in one of three ways. First, it 
can accept them — at least in part — and bring actions against the relevant 
directors and officers for breaching their fiduciary duties. Second, it can set 
up a special litigation committee to investigate the matter and make 
recommendations to the board of directors.111 Finally, it can refuse to take 
any legal action against the directors and officers. Refusal to concede to these 
demands invariably leads to the filing of derivative actions against the said 
directors and officers.112  
 
108 Section II.B.2. 
109 Recall, again, how Professor Richard Epstein described the PDAs as “confessions of 
a Stalinist purge trial.” Supra note 70. 
110  See Westbrook, supra note 26, at 1227. See also Mark, supra note 60, at 446 
(“Beginning in 2006 or so, the stepped-up enforcement of the FCPA by the DOJ and SEC 
has sparked a corresponding increase in collateral civil litigation predicated on facts alleged 
by the federal government in enforcement actions.”). It should be noted that sometimes the 
mere announcement of a criminal investigation can trigger the filing of derivative actions. 
111  See, generally, Minor Myers, The Decision of the Corporate Special Litigation 
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309 (2009); C. N. V. Krishnan, Steven 
Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Study of Special Litigation 
Committees (Mar. 2019),https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3053449. 
112 Of course, there are also costs for the firm. Although the main target of derivative 
actions are the directors and officers, not the company itself, they represent an unwelcome 
development for the company. It must be understood that the filing of a derivative action 
constitutes a serious distraction from the perspective of the company. If it is filed against 
present directors and officers, it prevents them from focusing exclusively on the affairs of 
the company. See supra note 84. Furthermore, since directors and officers are typically 
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A. When Directors and Officers Come Second 
It is impossible to overestimate the role of agency problems in corporate 
law.113 There exists a broad consensus among theorists and lawmakers that a 
principal goal of corporate law is to mitigate agency problems, first and 
foremost those exist between shareholders and managers. In a landmark 
contribution, Berle and Means noted that the separation between ownership 
and management, the hallmark of modern corporations, presents many 
advantages, but it also has a downside: it raises a risk that management would 
transfer wealth from the shareholders to its members.114  
Subsequently, scholars have pointed out the existence of other types of 
agency problem, i.e., conflicts of interest that are endemic to corporations. 
Another type of agency problem noted by corporate scholars is the tension 
between shareholders and creditors, with the former who are residual value 
claimants willing to take risks to maximize reward, while the latter who have 
a fixed claim preferring a much lower level of risk, if any.115 Then, scholars 
observed a third type of agency problem that exists between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders. 116  This problem focuses on the 
ability of majority shareholders to enrich themselves at the minority’s 
expense by forcing management to play along with this plan. Finally, Ronald 
Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon have identified yet another type of agency 
problem that arises between institutional investors and standard shareholders. 
In this case, the misalignment of interests arises from the different investment 
strategies of the two groups and their willingness to actively engage the 
management of companies in which they invest.117  
Our goal is to add to the canon of agency problems by drawing attention 
to the reverse agency problem that is gaining prominence in the compliance 
age. The reverse agency problem arises in the context of the enforcement 
actions against corporations. To reach an expedient resolution, corporations 
are willing to accede to the demands of the law enforcement authorities. 
Reaching a settlement is in the best interest of all parties involved. From the 
vantage point of the law enforcement authorities, settlements save scarce 
 
entitled to reimbursement of their legal expenses, it is the company that ends up footing the 
legal bills. Finally, the filing of derivative actions further harms the reputation of the 
company and hobbles its ability to do business.  
113 See, e.g., Goshen & Squire, supra note 2, at 769 (“For the last forty years, the problem 
of agency costs has dominated the study of corporate law and governance.”). 
114 See references in supra notes 1–2. 
115 John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 29-30 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3rd. ed., 2017). 
116  Id., at 29-30. See also Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes 
& Andrei Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000). 
117 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 2. 
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resources and allow the initiation of additional enforcement actions against 
other firms.118 From the perspective of firms, the sooner an investigation 
ends, the better.  
Settling the case means dramatic cost savings for the firm, relative to the 
option of indictment.119 It also frees up the company’s human resources, 
allowing the company to focus exclusively on its business.120  Finally, it 
removes a cloud of uncertainty from the firm,121 and signals to the market 
that the company has gotten back on track.122 
The consequences of a settlement are very different for the company’s 
employees and officers who were implicated in the investigation. The 
opening of a criminal investigation is like the opening of a Pandora’s box: it 
will certainly change the lives of the individual directors, officers and 
employees implicated for the worse, by imposing two major costs on them.  
First, their correspondence, documents and actions will be scrutinized and 
analyzed for evidence of wrongdoing. Although this is a necessary measure, 
it exposes the inner world of business organizations and the materials that 
were presumed to be private. 
 
118 United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-22.010. (“The major objectives of pretrial 
diversion are . . . [T]o save prosecutive and judicial resources for concentration on major 
cases”). See also Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: 
The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH L. REV. 1713, 1730 (2007); Brandon L. Garrett, 
Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 901 (2007); Christie Ford & David Hess, 
Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance? 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 680-1 
(2009). 
119  As Judge Kaplan stated in the case of KPMG: “Many companies faced with 
allegations of wrongdoing and under intense pressure to avoid indictment, as an indictment—
especially of a financial services firm—threatens to destroy the business regardless of 
whether the firm ultimately is convicted or acquitted.” U.S. v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 
338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
120 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the 
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. 
REV. 261, 272 &  n. 27 (1986); A.F. Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorneys 
Fees, 47 L. CONT. PROB. 269, 271 (“A less conspicuous but equally immediate cost of the 
derivative suit will be consumption of the time of the corporate officers and directors and 
their staffs and their consequent diversion of their best efforts from production and 
distribution.”). Interestingly, courts permit boards of public companies and special litigation 
committees appointed by the boards to take into account, when considering a demand for a 
derivative suit, also the time that corporate managers and directors will spend if participate 
in a trial. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1980). 
121 It is worth noting that “[I]n reality, it would almost never be possible to predict lost 
business from reputational damage . . . .” David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings, 
Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 49 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1254-5 (2016). 
122  See Brandon Garett, International Corporate Prosecutions, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS (Darryl K. Brown, Jenia I. Turner & Bettina Weisser eds. 
2019) (“[R]epresentatives of companies sometimes also prefer a swifter conclusion to a case 
to minimise the reputational risks to their corporation.”).   
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The famous case of KPMG 123 is illustrative. In 2003, the DOJ launched 
a criminal investigation against KPMG and many of its employees 
concerning the designing, marketing and implementing of illegal tax shelters. 
The DOJ took full advantage of KPMG’s vulnerability, pitting the company 
against its own employees, as described at length in Judge Kaplan’s decision: 
“The government took full advantage. It sought 
interviews with many KPMG employees and 
encouraged KPMG to press the employees to cooperate. 
Indeed, it urged KPMG to tell employees to disclose 
any personal criminal wrongdoing. When individuals 
balked, the prosecutors told KPMG. In each case, 
KPMG reiterated its threat to cut off payment of legal 
fees unless the government were satisfied with the 
individual's cooperation. In some cases, it told the 
employees to cooperate with prosecutors or be fired. 
The government obtained statements, commonly 
known as proffers, from nine KPMG employees who 
now are defendants here (the ‘Moving Defendants’). . . 
Having considered the evidence, the Court is persuaded 
that the government is responsible for the pressure that 
KPMG put on its employees. It threatened KPMG with 
the corporate equivalent of capital punishment. KPMG 
took the only course open to it.”124  
Judge Kaplan proceeded to state that the use of the Thompson Memo by 
prosecutors has produced “the exertion of enormous economic power by the 
employer upon its employees to sacrifice their constitutional rights.” 125 
Ultimately, the court suppressed many of the statements made by the 
individual employees of the KPMG, finding that they were obtained in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.126 
The case of KPMG is not an outlier or an isolated example; on the 
contrary, it is highly representative of the DOJ’s policy. Eastern District of 
New York Judge John Gleeson noted in the oft-cited case of HSBC that: 
“Recent history is replete with instance where the 
requirements of such cooperation have been alleged 
and/or held to violate a company’s attorney-client 
 
123 U.S. v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
124 Id., at 318 – 319.  
125 Id., at 337. 
126 Id., at 338.  
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privilege and work product protections, or its 
employees’ Fifth or Sixth Amendments rights.”127 
This concern of violation of employees’ Fifth Amendments rights in the 
context of criminal investigation within the firm has attracted also the 
attention of the academia.128 Legal counsels also voiced serious concerns 
about the “culture of waiver” adopted by the DOJ. 129  The DOJ itself 
acknowledged that: 
“The Department's policy with respect to privilege 
waivers became the subject of intense lobbying of 
Congress by the defense bar and the business community 
over the next few years. The American Bar Association, 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the National 
Association of Manufacturers decried what they claimed 
was a ‘culture of waiver,’ in which prosecutors almost 
 
127 United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). Judge Gleeson added that: “[F]or nearly ten years – from 1999 to 
2008 – the Department of Justice’s corporate charging policies, as articulated in the Holder, 
Thompson, McCallum, and McNulty Memos, emphasized the importance of corporate 
cooperation, including a willingness to waive the attorney-client and work product 
protections[;]” that “The DOJ’s corporate charging policies, as articulated in the Holder and 
Thompson Memos, also instructed federal prosecutors to consider the extent to which a 
cooperating company makes witnesses available to the government [;]” and that “the DOJ’s 
corporate charging policies, as articulated in the Holder and Thompson Memos, also 
instructed federal prosecutors to consider a company’s advancing of legal fees to employees, 
except as required by law, as potentially indicative of an attempt to shield culpable 
individuals, and therefore a factor weighing in favor of indictment of the company.” Id., at 
note 10–12. 
128 See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
1613, 1634-5 (2007) (“If firms are to require their agents to say what they know, some reason 
must be given to induce the agent to speak. The reason can only be what rests within the 
firm’s control: denial of the compensation or employment that the firm confers upon the 
employee.”); T.H. Waters III, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: An Examination of a 
‘Costly’ Right to Silence for Corporate Employees in Criminal Investigations, 25 REV. LIT. 
603, 605-6 (2006) (“The leverage gained from the corporation's compliance forces the 
employee to cooperate or risk losing her job.”). 
129 Statement of the Coalition to Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege, Submitted to the 
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Regarding Hearings on Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege: The Negative Impact for Clients, Corporate Compliance, and the American 
Legal System (September 12, 2006) (“Almost 75% of both inside and outside counsel who 
responded to this question expressed agreement (almost 40% agreeing strongly) with a 
statement that a ‘culture of waiver’ has evolved in which governmental agencies believe it 
is reasonable and appropriate for them to expect a company under investigation to broadly 
waive attorney-client privilege or work product protections.”). 
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immediately demanded privilege waivers upon initiation 
of an investigation.”130 
Second, the opening of a criminal investigation casts a heavy shadow on 
the integrity and reputation of the board and management of the suspect firm. 
This effect is unavoidable. The moment an investigation is announced, the 
directors and top managers have to deal with a whirlwind of rumors and 
suspicions that are kept alive by constant media coverage, as well as stories 
on blogs and social media.131 These rumors and suspicions cannot be easily 
set aside or disproved.132  
It is important to understand that the announcement of an investigation 
marks the beginning of the Via Dolorosa of the individuals implicated. 
Naturally, the investigation may lead to three possible outcomes: a finding of 
no wrongdoing, a settlement, or an indictment. Needless to say, the best 
 
130 James McMahon, Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 64 UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEY’S BULLETIN 1, 3 (July 2016). As the bulletin explains, “[w]ith the August 
2008 release of the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations—known 
informally as the Filip Memo—federal prosecutors, under most circumstances, are no longer 
permitted to ask a cooperating corporation or entity to waive its attorney-client or work 
product privileges as part of its cooperation.” Id., at 1. However, in 2015, the DOJ issued the 
Yates Memo, which requires a company to disclose “all relevant facts relating to the 
individuals responsible for the misconduct” for the company “to be eligible for any 
cooperation credit.” Yates Memo, supra note 8. See also Gideon Mark, The Yates 
Memorandum, 51 UC DAVIS 1589, 1602 (2018) (“Nevertheless, the consensus of the defense 
bar was that the Filip Memorandum did not cure the waiver problem created by prior 
Memoranda, with the result that counsel would often be forced to risk waiver in order to 
avoid an adverse DOJ action.”). 
131 Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 INDIANA L. 
J. 473, 501 (2006) (“Upon observing an instance of entity fault for criminality, persons may 
be less willing to contract with, employ, and rely upon individuals known to have 
contributed, in some way at least, to the formation of institutional conditions that produced 
that criminality.”). See also Id., at 502 (“The extent of both of these effects of reputational 
sanction on a firm is likely to vary according to a given individual's position within the 
organization. The more senior and responsible a person . . . the more likely that others will 
conclude that the message of firm fault conveys something significant about the 
individual.”). 
132 See Jonathan M. Karpoff; John R. Jr. Lott, The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from 
Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 792 (1993) (finding that companies 
charged with defrauding customers and other stakeholders have lower operating earnings 
over the following five years). In fact, practitioners have designed complicated strategies to 
the difficulty of dealing with potential reputational loss following the announcement of an 
investigation. See, e.g., Kevin Bailey & Charlie Potter, Protecting Corporate Reputation in a 
Government Investigation, Global Investigations Review (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/chapter/1079418/protecting-corporate-reputation-
in-a-government-investigation.  
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possible option from the vantage point of the company and its employees is 
the first one. Unfortunately, very few investigations have a happy ending.133  
Hence, a settlement or an indictment is a much more realist outcome.  
For the reasons we discussed in Part I, a considerable  number of 
investigations end in a settlement. As a part of the settlement, the company 
makes a series of admissions of wrongdoing, which it cannot renounce. It 
must also sign a statement of facts that is appended to the settlement 
agreement. The statement, too, contains a long and detailed enumeration of 
factual findings, which the firm is not allowed to dispute, deny or challenge, 
lest the agreement be rescinded. Frequently, the statements of facts describe 
the wrongdoing of the company, its managers, and its directors in very strong 
language stating that they “knowingly” and “willfully” violated the law, or 
“knowingly” failed to implement and maintain controls to address known 
risks. 
Critically, since firms are artificial entities, they cannot commit the 
elements of the criminal offenses attributed to them on their own; they must 
operate through human agents. It is the actions and mindsets of the 
corporation’s employees that establish the actus reus and mens rea of the 
offenses of which the corporation is accused. Accordingly, settlement 
agreements and statement of facts attribute various illegal actions, omissions, 
states of minds and intents to various agents of the firm.134 At the end of the 
process, the DOJ issues a press release describing in great detail the terms of 
the agreements and the confession made by the corporation. 
It must be emphasized at this point that the number of individual 
employees involved in a criminal investigation can be very high. When 
striving to finalize an agreement and collect a significant fine, law 
enforcement authorities do not typically dwell on the wording. Nor does the 
company under investigations. 135  Both parties are interested in a quick 
 
133 Based on data retrieved from the Corporate Prosecution Registry, a database that 
provides comprehensive and up-to-date information on federal organizational prosecutions 
in the United States, out of the 3429 criminal investigations conducted on corporations 
(among which 383 were on public corporations) between 1992 and 2019, only 179 resulted 
in acquittal, dismissal, or declination (among which 19 were on public corporations). Data 
& Documents, CORPORATE PROSECUTION REGISTRY, 
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/browse/browse.html 
(search Disposition Type field for “All,” “acquittal,” “dismissal,” and “declination.”). 
134 See Gibson Dunn-2017, supra note 38, at 3 (“Most NPAs and DPAs require a clear 
acknowledgement by the company that the statement of facts is ‘true and accurate,’ and that 
the company bears responsibility for the actions of officers, directors, employees and agents 
acting on its behalf.”). 
135 Koehler, supra note 16, at 554 (“Prosecutors have far less leverage over individuals. 
People, unlike corporations, often face the prospect of incarceration and financial ruin in the 
event of a criminal conviction. As a result, individuals are more likely to test the 
government’s legal theories and version of the facts. . . . [P]rosecutors know from their 
34 REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF COMPLIANCE [7-Aug-19 
 
 
resolution.136 The directors, officers and other employees get caught in the 
middle.  
Although corporations are willing to sacrifice both former and present 
employees to reach a settlement, there is an important difference between its 
treatments of the two groups. While present employees can have an indirect 
and limited input on the negotiations leading to the agreement, former 
employees are excluded from the process altogether. A clarification is in 
order here. As we discussed, the investigation is often conducted by external 
law firms and consultants that are hired for this purpose. Past and present 
employees, who are relevant to the investigation, are interviewed in the 
course of the investigations. Hence, they receive an opportunity to share their 
versions of what happened. Thereafter, they leave the floor to the attorneys 
to negotiate and draft the terms of the settlement agreement, including the 
exact wording of the statement of facts. Present directors and officers must 
approve the agreement on behalf of the corporation. Hence, they have an 
opportunity to review the draft and introduce very marginal changes to the 
wording, but they cannot realistically achieve more than this as the bargaining 
power lies with the law enforcement authorities.  
This is especially true given that although the final version of the 
agreement is provided to the board of directors for review only a few days 
before the date of signing. Although directors review the agreement before 
its approval, they are not involved, in any way, in the preparation of the 
agreement. Furthermore, when a settlement is presented to the board, the 
board faces a binary choice: approve or else the DOJ will reopen the case and 
even broaden the investigation to cover larger time periods and additional 
countries in which the company did business.   
Past employees are in worse shape. Their approval of the agreement is 
not required. They do not get a chance to review the agreement, nor do they 
receive an opportunity to comment on it. Worse yet, the present directors and 
officers have a strong economic motivation to settle expeditiously regardless 
of the ramifications for past employees. After all, they are eager to put the 
criminal investigation behind them and they owe a fiduciary duty to the 
corporation, not to their predecessors.137  
At this point, one might wonder: why is all this problematic? if an 
employee, current or former, committed a criminal offense, they should live 
with the consequences, whether or not she was given a fair hearing. But 
 
interactions with lawyers for individuals that, unlike with the corporation, they are likely to 
have a fight on their hands if they bring charges.”). 
136 Reilly, Sweetheart Deals, supra note 60, at 1120 (explaining how the DPAs “can be 
a means to: speedy and efficient dispute resolution”). 
137 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“Corporate officers and directors . . 
. stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.”).  
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therein lies the rub: many individual directors and officers have not violated 
the law and cannot be assumed to have done so. It is critical to understand 
that even though the liability of a corporation is based on the acts, omissions, 
intent and mental states of its officers and employees, it is much easier to 
assign criminal liability to a corporation than to its individual employees.138  
As we explained earlier, a corporation may be found guilty of criminal 
misbehavior even when none of its employees committed a criminal offense 
on her own. While in the case of individual liability, all the elements of a 
criminal offense must be performed by one person, in the case of corporate 
liability it is possible to collect elements from different employees and 
attribute them to the corporation.  
Two important doctrines that are routinely used by law enforcement 
authorities are responsible for this difference: the respondeat superior 
doctrine and the collective knowledge doctrine.  
The reponsdeat superior doctrine allows law enforcement authorities to 
attribute the acts, omissions and intents of various individual employees, 
including even low-level employees, to the corporation itself. On this theory, 
the corporation is deemed vicariously liable for the misdeeds of its agents; all 
individual wrongs, even if they do not suffice to establish personal liability, 
are channeled to the corporation, and, in the aggregate, they often suffice to 
impose liability upon it.139  
The collective knowledge doctrine enables law enforcement authorities 
to rely on the collective knowledge of all the employees of a corporation in 
order to find it guilty of a crime. Based on this doctrine, corporations have 
been found to be criminally guilty in cases in which no single agent satisfied 
the knowledge requirements necessary for a criminal conviction, but several 
agents collectively satisfied these requirements.140 
Accordingly, it is impossible to derive personal liability from the liability 
of the firm. This is not merely a theoretical point: attempts by law 
enforcement authorities to prosecute officers of corporations that admitted to 
wrongdoing often result in acquittals. Furthermore, in many cases, it is not 
even possible to impose civil liability on directors and officers pursuant to 
settlements. 141  There is a gulf between corporate liability and personal 
 
138 See supra note 83.  
139 See supra notes 73-79. 
140 See supra notes 80-82. 
141 One famous example is the case of the oil and gas services company Tidewater Inc. 
After the company resolved the FCPA investigation by signing a PDA, a derivative suit was 
filed against Tidewater’s directors. The district court in Louisiana dismissed the suit, with a 
conclusion that: “While Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to show that Tidewater was 
evidently violating both the FCPA and the Exchange Act, nowhere in the Complaint do 
Plaintiff’s allegations meet the specificity to show that the Individual defendants were acting 
with the intent to violate these laws. The mere fact that the violation occurred does not 
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liability. Yet, settlements are not sensitive to this fact. They are drafted in a 
sweeping manner that pays no heed to the consequences for the individual 
employees.  
Indeed, from a purely legal perspective, the admissions and statements 
made by corporations do not bind individual directors, officers and 
employees. They do not constitute res judicata as far as personal liability is 
concerned. However, from a practical perspective, the consequences for 
individual employees are severe.  
Employees who are covered by the PDAs do not have an opportunity to 
disagree with the statements that were made about them. They cannot initiate 
a legal proceeding to clear their name or even challenge the factual accuracy 
of the statements that pertain to them. Their only chance to do so is when a 
personal investigation is opened or if shareholders decided to bring derivative 
actions against them. But even this opportunity is more illusory than real. 
The broad and unequivocal admissions that are found in settlement and 
statements of facts practically invite the filing of derivative actions against 
the individuals who are mentioned in them. The signing of a settlement is 
almost invariably a prelude to civil litigation that comes on its heels.142 
Plaintiffs in derivative actions base their prima facie case on the admissions 
made by a company in its settlement with DOJ or other law enforcement 
authorities.143  
Plaintiffs often quote extensively from the admissions and findings in 
settlement agreements which do not go to the trouble of carefully addressing 
the potential personal liability of each individual director and officer, and the 
claims made by derivative plaintiffs. The admissions and findings list all 
directors, officers and other employees whose names were mentioned in the 
annual reports of the company during the years described in the settlement 
agreement as defendants and treat them as a monolithic group.  
We will elaborate on this point later. Here, it is worth noting that private 
plaintiffs have neither the capabilities nor the incentives to distinguish 
between good directors and officers and bad ones. Private plaintiffs, who are 
individual shareholders, have a very limited access to information about the 
company and its officers and directors. 144  Furthermore, the plaintiffs are 
frequently shareholders with a miniscule stake in the company, and therefore 
 
demonstrate that the board acted in bad faith” Strong v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D. 
La. 2012). As Professor Mike Koehler, a compliance expert, put it: “Not only was the 
Tidewater derivative claim, representative of the type of derivative claims frequently brought 
in the FCPA context, it was also representative of the outcome.” Mike Koehler, Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 391, 437 (2014).  
142 See supra note 110. 
143 Id. 
144  ARAD REISBERG, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 85–87 
(Oxford U. Press, 2007). 
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“ha[ve] very little incentive to consider the effect of the action on the other 
shareholders” and the company as a whole.145 
The directors and officers, who are listed as defendants, do not get a real 
opportunity to exonerate themselves. As Professor Amy Westbrook puts it 
more generally: “the majority of the recent shareholder derivative suits filed 
in the wake of FCPA actions have been dismissed, a handful have settled, and 
none have been fully litigated on the merits.”146 
Thus, at the end of the day, the directors and officers who were implicated 
in settlements do not have a real way to vindicate themselves. They have to 
live with the admissions and statements of facts made by their corporations. 
The ramifications for these individuals, who have done no wrong, are dire 
and far-reaching. Their reputation is irremediably harmed, as is their future 
employability and earning capacity.147 They have to deal with the financial 
and emotional consequences of a long criminal investigation that is often 
followed by civil litigation. All the while, they are being featured in 
uncomplimentary media reports. Worst of all, no extant law gives them an 
opportunity to set the record straight.  
The population of top corporate executives can be characterized as a 
small community. As Edward Rock has pointed out, "the senior managers 
and directors of large, publicly held corporations, and the lawyers who advise 
them form a surprisingly small and close-knit community. The directors of 
large, publicly held corporations number roughly four to five thousand."148 
Jayne Bernard further observed that “[i]n such a community, information 
travels, impressions are formed and hardened, loyalties are tested, and 
reputations are built and dismantled, extremely efficiently, often with just a 
few phone calls. In a rarefied community such as this, the role of reputation 
is significant.”149 
Finally, the allegations of wrongdoing made with respect to directors and 
other top officers may cause institutional investors to vote against the 
 
145 Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative 
Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 271 
(1986). 
146 Westbrook, supra note 26, at 1228. See also Kevin LaCroix, FCPA Follow-On Civil 
Actions: Frequently Filed, Less Frequently Successful (June 18, 2017),  
https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/06/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/fcpa-follow-
civil-actions-frequently-filed-less-frequently-successful/ 
147 See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1919 (1998) (noting that “while litigation is unlikely to cost 
[corporate managers and directors] their jobs, liability can damage their reputations and 
future careers”). 
148 Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013 (1997). 
149 Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 959, 966 (1999). 
38 REVERSE AGENCY PROBLEM IN THE AGE OF COMPLIANCE [7-Aug-19 
 
 
directors’ reelection150 or to act in order to fire other senior executives. Large 
institutional investors have become involved in monitoring the compliance 
of public companies, in which they invest, to laws and regulations. 
B. The Pooling Effect 
A root cause of the reverse agency problem is the collective treatment of 
directors and officers in settlements and the insinuation and the attribution of 
various elements of wrongdoing to them in order to establish the guilt of the 
corporation on which they serve. A typical agreement begins with a statement 
that the Company admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is responsible 
under Unites States law for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and 
agents. Later, the agreement describes in great detail how the company, via 
the actions and omission of its managers and employees, broke the law on 
during the time period covered by the agreement. The Agreement also 
describes how directors failed to adopt and implement any adequate 
compliance program, and how this failure enabled the wrongdoing.  
As such, the agreement does not distinguish between law abiding and 
diligent officers, directors and employees and their peers who broke the law 
or breached their fiduciary duties. Moreover, no names are mentioned in 
agreements; managers and directors are treated as an indistinguishable group. 
Thus, a pooling equilibrium is created. To illustrate this point, we revisit 
some of the largest agreements signed during the past few years, discussed in 
Section II.A.  
For instance, the plea agreement signed with Kellogg Brown & Root 
(KBR) states that “Kellogg Brown & Root LLC admits, accepts, and 
acknowledges that it is responsible for the acts of its predecessor companies' 
officers, employees, and agents as set forth below.”151 Likewise, the DPA 
that HSBC entered into, in the context of the Bank Secrecy Act, proclaims 
that “The HSBC Parties admit, accept and acknowledge that they are 
responsible for the acts of their officers, directors, employees, and agents . . . 
.”152 Similar statements can be found in the agreements signed with Telia,153 
 
150  Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of Corporate 
Compliance, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), at 42–44. 
151 Plea Agreement at 33, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root, 161 F. Supp. 3d 423 
(E.D. Tex. 2015) (No. H-09-071) [hereinafter KBR Plea Agreement]. 
152 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. HSBC No. 12-CR-763, 2013 
WL 3306161 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) [hereinafter HSBC DPA]. 
153 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2, United States v. Telia Company AB, No. 1:17- 
CR-00581-GBD (S.D.N.Y. 2017) https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/file/998601/download (“The Company admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is 
responsible under Unites States law for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and 
agents as charged in the Information, and as set forth in the attached Statement of Facts, and 
that the allegations described in the Information and the facts described in the attached 
Statement of Facts are true and accurate.”). 
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Petrobras,154 and USB. 155These examples are representative. The drafters of 
the agreements intentionally keep the language broad and vague, imputing 
potential responsibility to large groups of executives without distinguishing 
among them.  
It is noteworthy that some agreements contain language suggesting that 
had the matter been litigated, the consequences for the company would have 
been dire. For example, the agreement with KBR contains the following 
clause: “Had this matter proceeded to trial, the United States would have 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, by admissible evidence, the facts alleged 
in the Information.”156 The use of such statements sends a strongly negative 
signal about the parties involved, suggesting that they managed to avoid a 
sure criminal conviction.  
As a matter of fact, the pooling effect discussed above takes place not 
only in the agreements themselves. It begins much earlier at the moment an 
investigation is announced. Once an investigation has been initiated, the 
suspect company must issue an immediate report to notify the public of this 
development. In addition, the company is legally obliged to mention the 
ongoing investigation against it in quarterly and annual reports. These reports 
persist over a long period of time. In 2016, the median duration of FCPA 
enforcement actions was 4.25 years.157 During this time period, a gray cloud 
hangs over all of the company’s directors and officers,158 and a statute of 
 
154 Non Prosecution Agreement Re: Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobras (Sept. 26, 2018) 
(“The Company admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is responsible under Unites States 
law for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and agents as set forth in the attached 
Statement of Facts, and that the facts described therein are true and accurate.”). 
155  U.S. Bancorp DPA (Feb. 12, 2018), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/press-release/file/1035081/download (“USB stipulates that the facts set forth in the 
Statement of Facts, attached hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated herein, are true and 
accurate, and admits, accepts and acknowledges that it is responsible under United States 
law for the acts of its current and former officers and employees as set forth in the Statement 
of Facts”). 
156 See, e.g., KBR Plea Agreement, supra note 151, at 33. See also HSBC DPA, supra 
note 144 at 1 (“If this matter were to proceed to trial, the Department would prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, by admissible evidence, the facts alleged below and set forth in the 
criminal Information attached to this Agreement.”). 
157  THE GRAY CLOUD OF FCPA SCRUTINY LASTED TOO LONG IN 2016, 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/gray-cloud-fcpa-scrutiny-lasted-long-2016/ (last visited July 11, 
2019) [hereinafter THE GRAY CLOUD OF FCPA SCRUTINY]. 
158 Richard Cassin, The FCPA’s Long Shadow, THE FCPA BLOG (August 6, 2012), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/8/6/the-fcpas-long-shadow.html (“The threat of FCPA 
enforcement after a company self reports casts a long shadow. It darkens the future for 
management, shareholders, lenders, customers, and suppliers. Exactly the problem the 
statute of limitations was supposed to fix.”). 
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limitations is not going to help here.159 The public reports of the company 
describe how the company is subject to a criminal investigation, and, in some 
cases, reveal that the investigation identified certain practices and 
transactions that likely constitute violations of law. 
Finally, the pooling effect continues in formal publications made by 
enforcement authorities. Typically, after an agreement is signed, the 
enforcement authorities issue a press release that describes it in great detail. 
The content of the publications resembles the language used in the 
agreements and statements of facts. The enforcement authorities, for their 
part, have no incentive to soften the harsh language of the agreements; on the 
contrary, they want to send a clear and unequivocal message about the harsh 
consequences of breaking the law to the rest of the market. 
News about the agreement spreads fast. Publications made by authorities 
focus on the large fines the companies agreed to pay, and the companies’ 
admissions. The large penalties draw enormous public attention to the 
publications and readers are inevitably exposed to the admissions of guilt 
referencing the management and board of the relevant companies, who are 
once again referred to as a guilty group.  
These publications aggravate the plight of innocent directors and officers, 
adding an element of public shaming to their ordeal. This effect is accentuated 
by the motivation of enforcement agents to aggrandize their own 
achievements 160 in order to bolster their statutory enforcement powers.161 
This concern is exacerbated owing to the fact that publications by 
enforcement agencies are subject to very few procedural safeguards, if any.162 
When issuing a publication, enforcement authorities are generally not 
required to give prior notice or an opportunity to the company or its agents to 
be heard.163 At bottom, from the beginning of the investigation process until 
 
159 As one commentator explained: “Statute of limitations are ordinarily the remedy the 
law provides for legal gray clouds. Yet in corporate FCPA enforcement actions, the 
fundamental black-letter legal principle of statute of limitations seems not to matter 
because cooperation is the name of the game and to raise bona fide legal arguments such as 
statute of limitations is not cooperating in an investigation. Given the ‘carrots’ and ’sticks’ 
relevant to resolving corporate FCPA enforcement actions, one of the first steps a company 
the subject of FCPA scrutiny often does to demonstrate its cooperation is agree to toll the 
statute of limitations or waive any statute of limitations defenses.” THE GRAY CLOUD OF 
FCPA SCRUTINY, supra note 157. 
160 See Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 
211 BYU L. REV. 1371, 1378 (2011). 
161 See Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1380, 1398–1401 (1973). 
162 Cortez, supra note 160, at 1374. 
163 Id. at 1383. See also Gellhorn, supra note 161, at 1420 (“[U]sually no protection 
other than the common sense and good will of the administrator prevents unreasonable use 
of coercive publicity.”). 
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its end, the executives of the suspect company are treated as a monolithic 
group. Neither the companies nor the enforcement authorities have an 
incentive to carefully differentiate among wrongdoers and innocent parties. 
Both groups are pooled together.  
C. The Near Irrelevance of Standard Defense Mechanisms to 
the Reverse Agency Problem 
Thus far, we have analyzed in great detail the adverse effect of the reverse 
agency problem on corporate officers and employees, as is true of all agency 
problems. The reverse agency problem makes it harder and more expensive 
for corporations to hire good directors, managers and key employees. Of 
course, directors and officers who strayed from the right path should be held 
accountable for their decisions. As we emphasized time and again throughout 
the Article, we are in favor of meting out penalties to corporate officers who 
broke the law. The problem is that law enforcement authorities do not go into 
the trouble of assigning personal liability. In settlement agreements, all those 
involved are pooled together. Nor do corporations wish to expend the 
resources to distinguish among culpable and innocent employees. Currently, 
there is no way out of this pooling equilibrium.  
This state of affairs adversely affects good directors and managers. In a 
world with perfect separation between good directors and officers and bad 
ones, everyone will be rewarded and punished based on their performance. 
However, in the age of settlements, corporate directors and officers may bear 
the cost of the misdeeds of others. They no longer in full control of their own 
fate.164 Enforcement actions, and the settlements signed in their wake, create 
inter-dependencies among corporate agents. In the age of compliance, one 
bad apple can upset the applecart. Sometimes, one director or corporate 
officers who took matters into his own hands and broke the law can get an 
entire corporation and its top personnel in trouble. 
Over the years, corporate law has adopted several mechanisms to protect 
directors and officers from legal liability and thereby lower operation costs 
for firms. Standard theorizing assumes that higher exposure to legal liability 
must be offset by higher compensation. Hence, if directors and officers face 
a high risk of legal liability, they would require higher pay to offset this 
risk.165 The central mechanisms that were developed to shelter directors and 
 
164 Id.  
165 See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal 
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) (explaining how corporate liability imposes legal risks on 
corporate decisionmakers, and accordingly, how “competent corporate decisionmakers will 
either demand insulation from them or require compensation for bearing them.”) See also 
John E. Core, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, 64(1) J. 
RISK & INSURANCE 63, 66-67 (1997) (“The director will not serve unless the package offered 
meets his or her reservation utility . . . level of other pay necessary to compensate the director 
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officers from liability are the business judgment rule, exculpation clauses, 
directors and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance, and indemnification 
clauses. 
The business judgement rule immunizes directors and corporate officers 
against liability for harms arising from mistaken business decisions, as long 
as a decision was informed, made in good faith and without conflict of 
interest.166 Exculpatory clauses are implemented contractually and have the 
effect of relieving high level employees from liability arising from a breach 
of a duty of care owed to the corporation.167 D&O liability insurance protects 
the directors and officers of a corporation against personal losses resulting 
from a suit against them for violating a duty to the firm.168 Indemnification 
clauses guarantee directors and officers reimbursement for attorneys’ fees, 
legal expenditures and even judgment.169  
Although each of these mechanisms operate differently they share a 
common purpose: they aim to relieve directors and officers of the need to 
incur costs of pay damages for negligent breaches of the duty of care owed 
to the corporation. Corporations, for their part, are willing to limit the legal 
liability of their directors and managers since it lowers executive 
compensation.  
Critically, though, two of the aforementioned mechanisms—business 
judgement rule and exculpation—are not relevant in the context of criminal 
investigations. They are only available in the internal relationship between 
directors and officers and their firms. The other two mechanisms—
indemnification and insurance—are subject to mandatory “boundaries” and 
depend on the company’s willingness to provide them, its governing 
documents, and its insurance policy. 170  At any rate, none of these 
mechanisms  can compensate directors and officers for the reputational and 
 
for his or her [] any uninsured risk. Thus, other forms of director compensation are 
hypothesized to be substitutes for D&O insurance, for a decrease in the level of D&O 
insurance results in an increase in the amount of other pay required by the director as a 
compensation for the additional risk (the ‘risk premium’).”).  
166 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
167 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 102(b)(7) (2007). 
168 Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, Predicating Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from 
the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 487 (2007) 
(arguing that “[n]early all public corporations purchase D&O policies”).  
169 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 145(a) (2007). 
170 Id. Furthermore, it is worth noting that that insurance coverage is not unlimited. See, 
e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors and Officers’ 
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 805 (2009) (“If, as is generally 
the case, D&O insurance limits are significantly lower than potential investor losses.”) See 
also Id., at 798 (“The insurer will have two principal case-specific interests: first, and most 
obviously, to reduce settlement payouts; and second, to maximize investment returns by 
delaying the payout of invested capital.”). 
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economic harms they suffer as a result of criminal investigations and 
settlements. These harms lie outside the ken of the sphere of protection firms 
can provide.171  
Since companies cannot offer directors and officers adequate protection 
against the reverse agency problem, they would have to pay them higher 
compensation that reflects the increased risk to which they are exposed.172 
Given that it is impossible to know in advance which directors and officers 
would be affected by the higher risk—after all, enforcement actions can be 
random—firms would have to increase managerial compensation across the 
board. In some cases, the promise of higher compensation would suffice to 
persuade competent directors and managers to assume the risk. In others, 
potential directors and officers may decide to pursue different career 
opportunities. On the margin, the reverse agency problem would drive 
capable candidates away from the corporate world.173 This effect should be 
especially high among risk averse individuals, who would require very high 
compensation to take on extra risk. Indeed, there is already some evidence 
suggesting this effect is felt in the corporate world.174 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
In this Part, we consider possible mechanisms to address the reverse 
agency problem. As we explained, a root cause of the reverse agency problem 
is the collective treatment of directors and officers in settlements and the 
insinuation and the attribution of various elements of wrongdoing to them in 
order to establish the guilt of the corporation on which they serve.  
The sweeping statements that are made about directors, officers and other 
employees without giving them a way to clear their names are neither fair nor 
efficient. Hence, the mechanisms we propose in this Part aim at allowing 
 
171 David A. Skeel, JR., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1833 
(2001) (describing how defenses that the company provide to its directors and managers, 
such as insurance and indemnification, cannot protect them from reputational consequences). 
See also JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 52 (2008) (“[T]he prevailing norms of director behavior are stricter and less 
forgiving than the liability rules by which directors are evaluated.”). 
172 Supra note 165. 
173 Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1140 (2006) (arguing that “[a] significantly higher level of risk for 
outside directors could well deter good candidates from serving . . . .”). See also Financier 
Worldwide Magazine, Risks Facing Directors & Officers (August 2016) (“the potential to 
unfairly blame individuals when not warranted under the circumstances will only serve to 
deter qualified people from seeking out and taking director and officer positions.”) 
174 See Samuel W. Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, 12 CRIM. L. & 
PHIL. 471, 488 (2018) (“No wonder, then, that corporate managers, whenever they get a 
chance, express vocal complaints and fears about the potential ‘‘death knell’’ represented 
by the imposition of criminal liability on their firms.”).  
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directors and officers who were involved in criminal investigations to prove 
that they are neither guilty of a criminal offense nor that of a breach of a 
fiduciary duty to the corporation. In other words, our proposals are intended 
to break the pooling effect created by settlements and allow innocent and 
diligent directors and officers to distinguish themselves from their peers who 
broke the law. To this end, we propose three specific legal mechanisms that 
can ameliorate the reverse agency problem.  
The first mechanism seeks to amplify the voice of individual corporate 
officers in settlement negotiations by giving them a right to a hearing prior to 
the finalization of a settlement. This mechanism would enable individual 
directors and officers to review settlements and offer changes before they are 
signed. The second mechanism we contemplate is to give individual directors 
and officers who were implicated in settlements the right to bring an action 
for a declaratory judgment that could clear them of liability.  Doing so will 
grant innocent directors and officers the power to initiate legal action in order 
to dispel the suspicions that surround them and preempt derivative actions 
against them. Our third, and most far reaching mechanism, is to allow 
innocent directors and officers the right to sue their colleagues who went 
astray and precipitated a cascade of harms on the corporation and its 
employees.  
A. A Right to a Hearing 
One way to address the reverse agency problem is by providing interested 
corporate directors and officers the right to demand a hearing prior to the 
signing of a settlement. The hearing will be held by the relevant law 
enforcement agency at the end of the investigation after a detailed draft had 
been produced, but before the settlement is finalized. The reason for holding 
the hearing at this time is to give directors and officers an opportunity to 
review the statements made about them, consider their accuracy and propose 
amendments to the draft. It is noteworthy that small changes in the language 
of the settlement agreement may have a significant impact on the future of 
the directors and officers involved.175  
The holding of a hearing will give the employees who are covered in the 
settlement agreement an opportunity to set the record straight by correcting 
potential misstatements about them and other factual errors. It appears to be 
the simplest and the most cost-effective solution to the reverse agency 
 
175  To illustrate, there is a huge difference whether a DPA describes a felony as 
committed by “employees” or by “certain low level employees; similarly, there is a huge 
difference if a DPA states that the admission of the company is being made under the 
respondeat superior doctrine; finally, there is a huge difference between a DPA that states 
that the company and its officers “knowingly” and “willfully” committed the offence and a 
DPA that lacks such descriptions.  
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problem. True, the introduction of hearings will prolong investigations and 
increase their cost. Yet, reducing costs and shortening investigations are not 
goals in their own right; rather, they are important side constraints. The main 
goal is to improve accuracy in fact-finding and to further justice by giving 
directors and officers a final chance to exonerate themselves of wrongdoing. 
Hence, as long as the additional cost of holding hearings is not unreasonably 
high, it may be in society’s best interest to do this.  
The solution of hearings, while promising on its face, has an obvious 
downside. The effectiveness of this solution critically depends on the 
willingness of the enforcement agencies to receive input from individual 
directors and officers and change their recommendations accordingly. In 
other words, the success of hearings depends on the good faith and openness 
of the relevant administrative agencies.  
In our case, it is questionable that law enforcement agents would adopt 
the requisite mindset to make the hearings work. It must be born in mind that 
the hearings would come at the end of a long investigation involving 
interviews with all the relevant parties and careful legal analysis that yielded 
certain findings. At this point, the focus of the law enforcement agencies is 
on the large penalty that is about to be collected from the firm. Also, they 
may be facing pressures from the firm to bring the investigation to an end. 
Finally, inertia, a common phenomenon in administrative agencies,176 may 
limit the effectiveness of the proposed hearing. 
If law enforcement agencies cannot hold the hearings with an open mind 
and an open heart, the hearings will be counterproductive. Not only will the 
hearings be costly, but also in their aftermath, it will be nearly impossible for 
individual directors and officers to prove their innocence. After all, they were 
granted an opportunity to vindicate themselves and failed. At the end of the 
day, therefore, hearings should be adopted as a solution to the reverse agency 
problem only if lawmakers are convinced that the enforcement agents that 
administer them are open to persuasion.  
B. Declaratory Judgement 
Our second solution to the reverse agency problem relies on the courts. It 
harnesses the judicial system to help directors and officers. Specifically, we 
propose granting directors and officers who were implicated in investigations 
and settlements the right to seek a declaratory judgment in court to their name 
 
176 See, generally, STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 365 (Harvard U. 
Press, 2009) (“Thus, it will not be difficult for agencies to reach a decision and then to write 
whatever impact statement is needed to justify it. The temptation for the agency to do so will 
be great, because of its staff, through inertia, will tend to favor existing regulatory directions. 
And in many agencies it is common practice first to reach a decision and then to have a 
special opinion-writing section compose a statement in justification.”). 
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of wrongdoing. If successful, directors and officers should be able to receive 
indemnification from their companies for the legal fees and judicial costs they 
incurred. A declaratory judgment that clears individual agents of wrongdoing 
will dispel the uncertainty that hovers over them, prevent the automatic filing 
of derivative actions against them, and allow them to restore their 
reputation177  and carry on with their careers.178  
Giving directors and officers the right to sue for a declaratory judgement 
has several advantages over the option of granting them a right to a hearing 
with an enforcement agency. Judges, unlike law enforcement agents, are 
impartial, independent, and immune from market pressures. Judges are much 
more likely to consider the claims of directors and officers without prejudice 
and grant them the declaratory relief, when appropriate. Judges, of course, 
have no personal stake in the outcome of the case and will be guided by their 
sense of justice.  
Although we believe that the solution of declaratory judgments can help 
alleviate the plight of individual directors and officers, as well other corporate 
employees, it is not clear that they have standing to sue. It should be 
remembered that individual directors and officers are not a formal party to 
settlement agreements. Settlements are struck between corporations and law 
enforcement authorities. Hence, even though the findings of fact specified in 
settlement have a profound effect on the directors and officers, they do not 
legally bind the directors and officers. Thus, it is unclear that individual 
directors and officers have standing to sue.  
We believe that individual directors and officers should not be barred 
from suing. We therefore call on courts to open their doors to directors and 
officers who seek to exonerate themselves from allegations of wrongdoing. 
It must be realized that individual employees of corporations cannot 
challenge the content of settlements, nor do they have a meaningful way to 
correct the statements made about them by their corporations. Under these 
circumstances, courts should lend them a helping hand and allow them to 
initiate legal action to clear themselves. Leaving them to live with the 
negative implications of settlements to which they were not a party and could 
not meaningfully influence is a highly unjust result.  
 
177  In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court suggested a 
constitutional right to protect one’s reputation. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 
(1966) (“The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion 
and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth 
of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”). 
178 See e.g., Fredrick Lawrence, Declaring Innocence: Use of Declaratory Judgements 
to Vindicate the Wrongly Convicted, 18 PUBLIC INTEREST L.J. 391, 397 (2009) (“As a remedy 
to the stigma suffered by persons wrongfully accused or convicted of criminal acts, this 
Article proposes that persons wrongfully accused of criminal acts have a right to sue for a 
declaration of innocence.”). 
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C. An Action against Other Directors and Officers 
Our third solution to the reverse agency problem is to give innocent 
directors and officers legal recourse against their colleagues who broke the 
law and brought about the criminal investigation. After all, the criminal 
investigation against the firm was commenced for a reason and the 
admissions of guilt by the corporation are not groundless. In a typical case, 
the acts or omissions of those employees trigger the criminal investigation 
that will result in the attribution of illicit behavior to their colleagues, who 
have done no wrong. Under our proposal, directors and corporate officers 
who suffered losses as a consequence of the decisions or behaviors of their 
peers would be allowed to sue the peers to recover compensation for their 
losses.  
It should be emphasized that we will not allow suits against the 
corporation itself, but only against individual directors and officers who 
strayed from the path. Thus, neither the corporation nor its shareholders 
would be affected by our proposal. The implementation of our proposal 
requires the law to recognize a new fiduciary duty that will apply among 
directors and officers inter se. Under current law, directors and officers owe 
a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to their corporations, but not to one 
another.179 At present, therefore, fiduciary duties apply only vertically, in the 
relationship between corporations and their top agents.  
Elsewhere, we argued that the modern business world has become so 
complex and specialized that directors and corporate officers have become 
dependent on one another. Each of them brings a unique set of skills and 
backgrounds to the table. No individual director or officer can be expected to 
perform all the tasks that are necessary for the successful functioning of the 
corporation on her own. Hence, directors and managers have no choice but 
to rely on each other. Failure by one board member or manager can doom the 
entire board or management team. For this reason, we suggested recognizing 
a new fiduciary duty that would apply horizontally among directors and 
officers in their inner relations.180 A breach of the duty by a director or officer 
will enable other directors and officers who were harmed by the breach to 
seek damages from the delinquent actor.  
Allowing directors and officers to seek compensation from peers who 
harmed them will provide them with a way to recover for the losses that befell 
them. Unlike an administrative hearing or a declaratory judgment that does 
not address past harms, a suit for a breach of a horizontal fiduciary duty, if 
successful, would make the plaintiff whole. Furthermore, the introduction of 
 
179 Asaf Eckstein & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward a Horizontal Fiduciary Duty in 
Corporate Law, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 803 (forthcoming 2019). 
180 Id.  
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momentary damages will allow courts to apportion liability among 
defendants or reduce compensation awards in cases in which plaintiffs are 
found contributorily negligent. In other words, the use of monetary damages 
will allow courts to go beyond all or nothing solutions.   
D. A Lawsuit against the Company? 
A fourth possible solution to the reverse agency problem is to give 
directors and corporate officers a cause of action against the corporation for 
unnecessarily implicating them in wrongdoing.181 On its face, this appears 
like a straightforward response to the reverse agency problem. After all, it is 
the company that chose to enter into the agreement and did not go into the 
trouble of carefully distinguishing between culpable executives and innocent 
ones. A closer examination reveals that the matter is not nearly as simple as 
it may appear on first blush. As we explained throughout the Article, the 
decision to enter into an agreement with the enforcement authorities and do 
so expeditiously is in the best interest of the company. Furthermore, the 
board, in deciding to negotiate and approve a settlement, acts within its 
fiduciary duty to the company. At present it owes no fiduciary duty to past 
executives and directors, or even to the serving ones.  Neither does the 
company.182  
In order to allow executives to sue the firm, it is necessary to create a new 
legal duty, not necessarily a fiduciary duty, that obliges the company to treat 
its agents fairly and not sacrifice or even jeopardize their reputation to 
promote the interest of the firm. It is, of course, possible to recognize such a 
duty, but doing so will engender a problem of split loyalties. Presently, at 
least under the predominant view, corporate agents have a single goal: 
maximizing shareholders’ profits. As we impose additional duties on 
corporate officers and directors, we put them in very difficult situations, 
requiring them to favor one group of stakeholders over another.  
Furthermore, in the case of settlements, companies do not have a lot of 
leeway. They face a take it or leave it situation. It is the enforcement 
authorities who are in the driver’s seat. Companies do not have any real 
bargaining power. Therefore, allowing individual executives to file suits 
against their company under these circumstances strikes us an extreme 
measure. After all, one might wonder: why not let executives sue law 
enforcement authorities? We clearly do not support this option. Law 
enforcement authorities should be able to do their job undeterred. As for the 
possibility of allowing executives to sue companies, we believe it should be 
reserved, if at all, to extreme cases in which companies were reckless or 
grossly negligent. This standard would require plaintiffs to prove that 
 
181 We are grateful to Zohar Goshen for pointing out this possibility to us.  
182 Supra note 137. 
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companies could easily distinguish between them and their guilty peers, but 
elected recklessly not to do so.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this Article we demonstrated that the agency problem in corporate law 
is not one directional as conventional theory suggests, but rather 
bidirectional. Since the seminal article of Berle and Means, a central tenet of 
corporate law scholarship and policy has been that corporate officers and 
directors would sacrifice the interests of their companies and shareholders to 
promote their own narrow self-interest. We showed that the reverse 
phenomenon also exists. Companies facing criminal and regulatory 
investigations are willing to sacrifice their top officials, indeed all of their 
employees, in order to appease the investigating authorities and strike a 
favorable settlement with them. We dubbed this phenomenon: the reverse 
agency problem.  
Like its more famous kin, the reverse agency problem arises from 
perfectly rational motivation: the desire of firms to avoid criminal indictment 
and bring criminal investigation to a rapid close is perfectly sensible. The fact 
that to achieve this goal firms are willing to attribute wrongdoing to a large 
group of directors and managers, without distinguishing among guilty and 
innocent individuals, is consistent with the wealth maximization goal of  the 
firm and its shareholders.  
Yet, the rush of companies to settle imposes a dear cost on innocent 
corporate officers by implicating them in various forms of wrongdoing 
without giving them any opportunity to clear their name. These officers are 
left to bear the mark of Cain for the rest of their career as extant law does not 
afford them with any procedural or substantive means of clearing themselves. 
Worse yet, the allegations of guilt made about them in settlement agreements 
expose directors and officers to subsequent derivative suits from 
shareholders. In the compliance age, as the number of enforcement actions 
continues to increase, so will the scope and severity of the reverse agency 
problem.  
As we emphasized time and again throughout the Article, we do not 
excoriate the increase in criminal enforcement against corporations and their 
employees. On the contrary, we fully support this trend. It is not criminal 
enforcement per se that is the root cause of the reverse agency problem, but 
rather the zeal of corporations and enforcement authorities to consummate 
settlements expeditiously while attributing guilt indiscriminately to large 
numbers of individual employees and grouping together guilty and innocent 
corporate officers in the process. In addition to unveiling the reverse agency 
problem and analyzing its causes and effects, we proposed three mechanisms 
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that could ameliorate the problem. Our first proposal was to hold special 
hearings that would give directors and officers an opportunity to set the 
record straight prior to the finalization of settlements. Our second suggestion 
was to allow directors and officers the right to seek a declaratory judgment 
clearing them of wrongdoing. Our third and final mechanism was to enable 
corporate officers who suffered reputational harms on account of wrongful 
actions or omissions by their peers to seek recourse from the latter by bringing 
civil actions against them. It is our hope that by unveiling the reverse agency 
problem, our article brings about a fuller and more nuanced understanding of 
the complex interaction between firms and their officers.  
